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BULK SALES LAWS: PROPERTY INCLUDED*
FRANK W. MILLERt
The interrelationship between the problem of what businesses are
covered and that of what goods are covered by bulk sales statutes has
already been stated.1 In an earlier article the more general problem
of what kinds of transactions are included was considered from the
viewpoint of what businesses are covered.2 This necessarily involved
a consideration of what constitutes merchandise within the meaning
of bulk sales statutes, since in most of the cases, the question was
whether the business was a mercantile business, and a mercantile
business is one which sells merchandise. The analysis contained in
that article yields the conclusion that if what has been sold can be
described as merchandise, the subject matter of the transaction under
scrutiny falls within every bulk sales statute. This is not to say that
every court has defined merchandise in such a way that all of the
things included by each other court under that term will be included
by it. Thus, to some courts the finished goods of a manufacturing es-
tablishment are merchandise,3 while the same is not true of other
courts. Nevertheless the basic proposition remains valid; if the court
is willing to call it merchandise, then it is covered by the statute. The
reason is obvious: every statute uses the term merchandise or its
equivalent.5 Here there is no room for judicial interpretation beyond
*This is the second in a series of three articles by Professor Miller considering
the problem of the kinds and quantity of goods and the kinds of business covered
by the bulk sales statutes. Bulk Sales Laws: Businesses Included, appears in the
February, 1954, issue and Bulk Sales Laws: Meaning to be Attached to theQuantitative and Quaitative Requirements Phrases of the Statutes, will appear
in the June, 1954, issue of the WASHiNGTON UNivEnSiT- LAW QUARTERLY.
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law.
1. Miller, Bulk Sales Laws: Businesses Included, 1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 1.
2. Ibid. The problems are discussed in Billig and Smith, Bulk Sales Laws:
Transactions Covered by the Statutes, 39 W. VA. L.Q. 323 (1933).
3. E.g., Mosson v. Kriser, 212 App. Div. 282, 208 N.Y. Supp. 566 (1st Dep't
1925).
4. E.g., Gitt v. Hoke, 301 Pa. 31, 151 Atl. 585 (1930). The problem is dis-
cussed and the cases reviewed in detail in Miller, supra note 1, section II.
5. The following statutes cover a "stock of merchandise": ALA. CODE tit. 20,§ 10 (Supp. 1951); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-1501 (1947); COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 27,§ 1 (Supp. 1952) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6705 (1949) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2101
(1953); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 121% § 78 (Suep. 1953); IND. ANN. STAT. § 33-201
(Burns 1949); IOWA CODE ANN. c. 555, § 55 .1 (1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 58-101(1949); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2961 (1950); ME. REV. STAT. c. 106, § 6 (1944);
MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 106, § 1 (1947); Micn. STAT. ANN. § 19.361 (1937); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 513.18 (West 1947); MIss. CODE ANN. § 274 (1942); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 427.020 (Vernon 1950); NEB. REV. STAT. § 36-501 (1952); N.H. REV.
LAws c. 262, § 43 (1942); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:29-1 (1940); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 53-1001 (1941); N.Y. PERS. PROF. LAW § 44; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-23 (1950);
N.D. Rnv. CODE § 51-0201 (1943); OHIO G . CODE ANN. § 11102 (1938); R.I.
GEN. LAWS c. 483, § 1 (1938); S.C. CODE § 11-201 (1952); S.D. CODE § 54.0301(1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 7283 (Williams 1934); TEx. REV. CIY. STAT. ANN.
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the decision as to whether the particular chattel in question constitutes
merchandise. Of course the reverse is not necessarily true.6 Many of
the statutes expressly cover items other than merchandise,7 and some
of them have been interpreted to cover non-merchandise items of a
business which has no merchandise8 Although some of the latter
decisions are demanded by express statutory language, others are
clearly misinterpretations." For the most part, however, both the
language of the statutes and the language of the cases have indicated
primary interest in the problem of whether fixtures have been covered
under varying circumstances, and what, as a matter of definition, are
fixtures. In some cases the statutes are broad enough to cover any
chattel of a business,", so that the only question is whether the busi-
ness is a mercantile one, or even whether any chattels have been sold.
The cases in this area also announce the rules of statutory interpre-
tation, but again there seems to be no satisfactory method of evaluat-
ing the impact of the rules. There is nothing in the cases to suggest
that the observations made in an earlier article", (that such canons
serve merely as props, as rules of convenience) are invalid. On the
other hand, on this issue, the interpretation has frequently been a
liberal-in-fact one, regardless of the nominally applicable canon of
statutory interpretation.
A. What is "merchandise." "goods, wares and/or merchandise," "a
stock in trade"?
There can be no real argument as to the presence of certain specific
criteria in defining merchandise under the bulk sales statutes. Al-
art. 4001 (1945); VT. REV. STAT. § 7846 (1947); VA. CODE § 55-83 (1950);
Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 41-701 (1945). The following statutes cover a "stock
in trade": ARIz. CODE ANN. § 58-301 (1939); CAL. CIV. CODs § 3440.1 (Supp.
1953). The following statutes cover "goods, wares and merchandise," or "goods,
wares or merchandise": D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-1701 (1951); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 726.02 (1944); GA. CODE ANN. § 28-203 (1952); IDAHo CODE ANN. § 64-701(1948); Ky. REV. STAT. § 377.010 (1953); MD. ANN. CODE GrN. LAWS art. 83,§ 97 (1951); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 18-201 (1947); Nzv. ComP. LAWS § 6816(Supp. 1949); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 71 (1937); ORE. REV. STAT. § 79.010(1953); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-2-1 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE § 63.08.010 (1951);
W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 4001 (1949); WIS. STAT. § 241.18 (1951). The present
Pennsylvania statute covers a "stock of goods, wares or merchandise," (PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 521 (1931), but, effective July 1, 1954, the Bulk Transfers
Article of the Uniform Commercial Code (Official Draft, Text and Comments
Ed. 1952) but incorporating the Recommendations of the Editorial Board forChanges in the Text and Comments of the Uniform Commercial Code Official
Draft, Text and Comments Edition of June 1, 1953, will be the law of Pennsyl-
vania, and will comprise part of Title 12A of Purdonis Statutes, the balance of
which title will be the remainder of the Uniform Commercial Code. Section 6-102(1) refers to "materials, supplies, merchandise or other inventory."
6. Miller, supra note 1, particularly section II, g.
7. See note 43, infra.
8. Miller, supra note 1, particularly section II, g.
9. Ibid.
10. See text at § B., (4) infra.
11. Miller, supra, note 1, at note 30.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1954/iss2/2
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
though the definitions given in the cases take somewhat different
forms, nevertheless, they all in effect conclude that merchandise is
tangible personal property which a businessman has purchased for
the purpose of resale as a routine part of his business of selling such
things. There are questions of whether what is purchased and sold,
either in a changed form or as an integral part of a transaction also
involving the sale of personal services, loses its character as mer-
chandise by reason of the change in form or the tie-in with the sale
of services, and the resolution of those questions has not been uniform.
But that is merely a different way of stating the same problem which
formed the subject matter of an earlier article in this series12 and
will not be re-analyzed here except insofar as necessary to make
clear the rationale of the cases which belong in this article.
It is also true that the basic phrase "goods, wares and merchan-
dise," has been occasionally expanded to include what most courts
would call fixtures or equipment, but such holdings are unusual. In
short, we may safely conclude that merchandise means what every
layman thinks it means, goods which are owned by businessmen for
the purpose of selling them to the next echelon in the chain of distri-
bution, whether that be the ultimate consumer or not.
B. Fixtures.
The question which arises most frequently in cases of the class
under discussion is whether the sale of anything other than what is
deemed merchandise by the particular court is covered by bulk sales
statutes. Normally the items in dispute are what may be termed
equipment used in the particular business, e.g., the things which are
used in the display and delivery of the merchandise. The particular
word used most commonly in the statutes, and consequently in the
cases, is "fixtures," although several of the statutes use much broader
terminology, such as "equipment" or "other goods and chattels." The
general problem is divisible into sub-problems and the lines of classi-
fication are dictated by a grouping of similar kinds of bulk sales
statutes. The following sub-problems are presented by the statutes
and cases:
(1) Are fixtures included if they are part of the subject matter of a
transaction which also includes merchandise?
(2) Are fixtures included if they are sold independently of any mer-
chandise?
(a) If it is a mercantile business?
(b) If the business has no stock in trade?
(3) The meaning of the term "fixtures" in bulk sales statutes.
12. MIiller, supra note 1, passimn
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(4) A special consideration of the statutes which use language more
clearly inclusive of all kinds of non-merchandise items than is
the term "fixtures."
Questions (1) and (2) (a) will be discussed with reference to
several kinds of statutes as follows:
[a] Those which make no mention of fixtures.
[b] Those which include merchandise and fixtures, and connect up
the two by the conjunctive, thus, "merchandise and fixtures."
[c] Those which include merchandise and fixtures, and connect up
the two with the disjunctive, thus, "merchandise or fixtures."
[d] The more broadly worded statutes to the extent that any of the
problems under discussion here have been decided under them.
It will be readily observed that question (2) (b) is merely a restate-
ment of a part of the more general problem of what businesses are
covered discussed in the first article of this series and consequently
will not be re-examined here except to the extent necessary to insure
clarity and completeness.
(1) Are fixtures included if they are part of a transaction which
also ichdes merchandise?
[a] Under statutes whichk zmake no mention of fixtures or equip-
ment?
Many of the present bulk sales statutes make no mention of fix-
tures,'- and many of the earlier ones, 14 since amended to take a
broader form, likewise were silent on the point. Nearly all of the
cases construing such statutes have taken the position that fixtures
are not contemplated by them, even though the transaction is one in-
volving the transfer of merchandise as well.'1 The rationale of those
13. ALA. CODE tit. 20, § 10 (Supp. 1951), §§ 11 to 14 (1940); ARIZ. CoDn ANN.
• 58-301 (1939); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §q 2101 to 2104 (1953); D.C. CODE ANN.
*1 28-1701 to 28-1705 (1951); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 726.02 to 726.06 (1944); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 28-203 to 28-206 and 28-9901 (1952); Ms. REv. STAT. c. 106, §§ 6
to 7 (1944); MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 106, H 1 to 2 (1947); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 513.18 (West 1947); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 274, 277 and 278 (1942); N.H. Rsv.
LAWS c. 262, .§ 43 to 44 (1942); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-1001 to 53-1003 (1941);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-23 (1950); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 71 to 74 (1937);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 7283 to 7285 (Williams 1934); VT. REV. STAT. §§ 7846 to
7847 (1947).
14. Conn. Laws 1901, c. 161; Idaho Laws 1903, c. 11; Md. Laws 1900, c. 579,
i 18; Mont. Laws 1907, c. 145; Neb. Laws 1907, c. 62; Nev. Laws 1907, c. 102;
Ore. Laws 1898, p. 248, § 2; S.C. Laws 1906, No. 1; Tex. Laws 1909, c. 27; Utah
Laws 1901, c. 67; Wash. Laws 1901, c. CIX; W. Va. Laws 1909, c. 78.
15. Nolte v. Winstanley, 16 Ariz. 327, 145 Pae. 246 (1914); Boise Ass'n. of
Credit Men v. Ellis, 26 Idaho 438, 144 Pac. 6 (1914) ; Rabalsky v. Levenson, 221
Mass. 289, 108 N.E. 1050 (1915); Adams v. Young, 200 Mass. 588, 86 N.E. 942(1909); Gallus v. Elmer, 193 Mass. 106, 78 N.E. 772 (1906); Kolander v. Dunn,
95 Minn. 422, 104 N.W. 371 (1905) ; Botsford v. Holcomb, 127 Neb. 85, 254 N.W.
687 (1934); Marshon v. Toohey, 38 Nev. 248, 148 Pac. 357 (1915); Hood Rubber
Products Co. v. Dickey, 167 Okla. 304, 29 P.2d 115 (1934); Texas Hide & Leather
Co. v. Bonds. 155 Okla. 3, 8 P.2d 20 (1932); Muskogee Wholesale Grocer Co. v.
Durant, 49 Okla. 395, 153 Pac. 142 (1915); Rice v. West, 80 Ore. 640, 157 Pac.
1105 (1916) ; Smith v. Boyer, 119 S.C. 176, 112 S.E. 71 (1921) ; Straus Cigar Co.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1954/iss2/2
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cases which exclude fixtures, even under the combined sale situation,
is exemplified by the following language from an early Idaho case:18
We think that merchandise as used in this statute must be con-
strued to mean such things as are usually bought and sold by
merchants. Merchandise means something that is sold every day
and is constantly going out of the store and being replaced by
other goods, but the fixtures are not a part of the trade or busi-
ness; they are not sold in the ordinary trade as goods. They re-
main from year to.year. The merchant could not dispose of them
as long as he remains in business. It is true that shelving, count-
ers, drawers, tables and many other things are necessary in
order to conduct the business of the retail merchant, and so are
delivery wagons in the larger towns to deliver goods, and clerks
to sell the goods, and so is a house or room in which to keep them,
but the clerks are not part of the goods, wares or merchandise,
and though the business cannot be conducted without a house or
place to keep and display the goods, the house or the room where
they are sold is not a part of the goods, wares and merchandise. 1
In some of the cases the argument was advanced that an interpreta-
tion that fixtures are included would strengthen the bulk sales acts,
but the courts have almost uniformly resisted such blandishments
and have held, properly, that the strengthening of bulk sales laws is
a legislative matter.3
Subject to the exceptions discussed, infra, the courts with similar
statutes have reached the same conclusion as that reached by the
Supreme Court of Idaho-" Thus in Massachusetts, in spite of a state-
ment in one case that ..... 'merchandise' is a word of large significa-
tion and has been held to be synonymous with tangible property which
could be sold... ,,,o the case law is clear that fixtures are not part of
a stock of merchandise.2U Decisions from Minnesota,22 Nevada,2'
v. Bon Marche, 142 Tenn. 129, 218 S.W. 219 (1919); Third National Bank of
Nashville v. Keathley, 35 Tenn. App. 82, 242 S.W.2d 760 (1951); Albrecht v.
Cudihee, 37 Wash. 206, 79 Pae. 628 (1905).
16. Boise Ass'n. of Credit Men v. Ellis, 26 Idaho 438, 144 Pac. 6 (1914).
17. Id. at 448, 449, 144 Pac. at 9. The Idaho statute has since been amended
to cover fixtures whether sold in connection with merchandise or not. IDAHO CoDE
ANN. § 64-701 (1948).
18. That argument was made and rejected in the Boise case, ibid., but was ac-
cepted in Walton v. Walter Fisher Co., 146 Miss. 291, 111 So. 364 (1927).
19. See note 15 supra.
20. Tupper v. Barrett, 233 Mass. 565, 568, 124 N.E. 427, 428 (1919).
21. Rabalsky v. Levenson, 221 Mass. 289, 108 N.E. 1050 (1915); Adams v.
Young, 200 Mass. 588, 86 N.E. 942 (1909); Gallus v. Elmer, 193 Mass. 106, 78
N.E. 772 (1906).
22. Kolander v. Dunn, 95 Minn. 422, 104 N.W. 371 (1905). In Melges Brothers
Co. v. Duluth Brewing & Malting Co., 118 Minn. 139, 136 N.W. 401 (1912), how-
ever, the court did not distinguish between the merchandise and fixtures sold
in reversing for new trial on the ground of erroneous instructions on the issue of
whether the transaction was bona fide, but it is doubtful that this should be in-
terpreted as meaning that fixtures are covered by the Minnesota statute in some
cases.
23. Marshon v. Toohey, 38 Nev. 248, 148 Pac 357 (1915), holds that the trans-
fer of a stock of liquors, furnishings used in connection with a dance-hall and
Washington University Open Scholarship
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North Carolina,24 Tennessee,2 West Virginia, ' Nebraska, 27 Okla-
homa, " Montana, 29 Washington,- Oregon,:" and Arizona, 32 all support
bar, and some money representing proceeds from the bar, yas invalid insofar as
the stock of liquors and the money were concerned but valid as to the other items.
The Nevada statute has since been amended to cover fixtures whether or not sold
in connection with merchandise. NEv. COMP. LAWS § 6816 (Supp. 1949).
24. In Swift & Co. v. Tempelos, 178 N.C. 487, 101 S.E. 8 (1919), after holding
that a restaurant business falls outside the statute on the ground that it is a
non-mercantile business, the court went on to say:
As to the furniture and fixtures used in the business of the keeper of the
cafe, they are not kept for sale, and are not within the provisions of the
statute. Now, if this stock itself is within it, it may be that, when the furni-
ture and fixtures are sold with it, so as to be, in fact, a "clean-up" sale of the
whole business, the appellee's position might, perhaps, be correct, but we do
not decide, or intimate any opinion as to such a question.
Id. at 492, 101 S.E. at 10. The court went on, however, to quote from Gallus v.
Elmer, 193 Mass. 106, 78 N.E. 772 (1906), the leading case for the proposition
that fixtures are not covered even though accompanied by a sale of merchandise,
with full approval and as representative of their (the North Carolina court's)
view on the matter.
25. Straus Cigar Co. v. Bon Marche, 142 Tenn. 129, 218 S.W. 219 (1919);
Third National Bank of Nashville v. Keathley, 35 Tenn. App. 82, 242 S.W.2d 760(1951). See also, Henry King & Co. v. Arnett Bros., 7 Tenn. App. 410 (1928),
in which no appeal was taken from the ruling of the trial chancellor that fixtures
are not covered even when part of a sale of both merchandise and fixtures.
26. In Lewis, Hubbard & Co. v. Loughran, 85 W. Va. 235, 101 S.E. 465 (1919),
the court, after holding that the operator of a lunch-wagon carried no merchan-
dise of any kind, went on to say:
What was the purpose of the Legislature in passing this Act? Evidently to
preserve for those engaged in the wholesale mercantile business, as security
for the payment of their debts for merchandise, the merchandise itself, un-
less the same was sold in the ordinary course of trade. The language "stock
of merchandise, or any part thereof," was never intended to include the
furniture, fixtures and appliances necessarily employed in the conduct of the
business, for the very good reason that they are not sold by such merchants
in the ordinary course of their business at all, and by its terms the act only
applies to such merchandise as is sold in the ordinary and usual conduct of
the business.
Id. at 240, 101 S.E. at 467. The West Virginia statute has subsequently been
amended to cover fixtures whether or not sold in connection with merchandise.
W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 4001 (1949).
27. In Lee v. Gillen & Boney, 90 Neb. 730, 134 N.W. 278 (1912), the owner
of a confectionery, who manufactured and sold ice cream and confections, and
sold drinks from his soda fountain, gave a chattel mortgage on his machinery and
equipment and on his stock of raw materials. The court held the statute inappli-
cable to ".. . fixtures or a manufacturer's stock of raw materials." In Botsford v.
Holcomb, 127 Neb. 85, 254 N.W. 687 (1934), after holding that there had been
substantial compliance with the statute in a sale of both merchandise and fixtures,
the court cited the Lee case for the proposition that the statute does not apply
to sales of fixtures. It should be noted that in the Lee case, no merchandise was
sold, and that in the Botsford case, the act was complied with, with the result
that neither case is a holding that the sale of fixtures is not interdicted by the
statute if sold with merchandise. It seems fairly clear, however, that the language
is sufficiently broad to justify the inference that a sale of fixtures is never in-
cluded. Since these cases, the Nebraska statute has been amended to include
fixtures whether sold alone or in connection with merchandise. NEB. REv. STAT.
36-501 (1952).
28. Hood Rubber Products Co. v. Dickey, 167 Okla. 304, 29 P.2d 115 (1934);
Texas Hide & Leather Co. v. Bonds, 155 Okla. 3, 8 P.2d 20 (1932); Muskogee
Wholesale Grocer Co. v. Durant, 49 Okla. 395, 153 Pac. 142 (1915).
29. In Ferrat v. Adamson, 53 Mont. 172, 163 Pac. 112 (1917), the owner of
a pool hall sold the entire business, including pool-tables, cues and balls, as well
as small quantities of tobacco, cigars, etc., which he kept for sale. A creditor of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1954/iss2/2
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the proposition that fixtures are not covered by the limited language
statutes under which the cited cases were decided.
Decisions from three jurisdictions are opposed to the rule stated
above. Although the Mississippi cases"3 clearly establish the rule that
fixtures are covered when they accompany merchandise in a single
transaction, they go farther, reaching the position that the sale of
fixtures alone is included within the area where compliance is neces-
sary, and so will be discussed in that connection. In Georgia, however,
a line of cases has been decided apropos to the point under discussion,
but reach an opposite conclusion from that reached by most states.
In Parham, & Co. v. Potts-Thompson Liquor Co.,34 a stock of liquors
and bar fixtures, safes, desks, cash registers, cigar cases, pool tables
and refrigerators were sold without compliance with the statute. The
court held that the enumerated items ". . . used in connection with a
business to which they are appropriate, in facilitating the operation
the seller reduced his claim to judgment, secured an execution and had a constable
seize and sell the pool-tables, cues and balls as the property of the seller. In the
purchaser's action for damages against the constable, the court, without deciding
that enough merchandise was or was not involved to make the business a mercan-
tile one, held that the items sold under execution did not fall within the bulk sales
statute on the ground that they were not kept for sale in the ordinary course of
business. The Montana statute has since been amended to cover "trade fixtures,"
at least where they are sold in connection with merchandise. MONT. Rsv. CODES
ANN. § 18-201 (1947).
30. The Washington cases under the early statute in that state are not con-
clusive. The first of the cases in point is Plass v. Morgan, 36 Wash. 160, 78 Pac.
784 (1904). There the sale of what was described in the plaintiff's afidavit con-
troverting garnishee defendant's answer as the goods, ware and merchandise of
a boarding house and restaurant was held to be covered by the statute on the
ground that there was
. . . no limit placed by the legislature on the meaning of the word "stock."
A stock of goods may mean, under the plain language of the statute, a great
many different kinds of goods, different kinds of wares, or different kinds
of merchandise.
Id. at 162, 78 Pac. at 785. The following year, without any mention of the Plass
case, the court held that the statute applied only to items kept for sale, finding
that the words "goods, wares or merchandise" were limited by the term "stock."
Albrecht v. Cudihee, 37 Wash. 206, 79 Pac. 628 (1905). Faced with these directly
opposed interpretations, the court, in Everett Produce Co. v. Smith Bros., 40
Wash. 566, 82 Pac. 905 (1905), followed the Albrecht case, but distinguished the
Plass case on the ground that in that case the items sold were items kept for sale,
though in altered form, whereas in the instant case, nothing was sold in ordinary
course by the keeper of a livery stable except services. In Friedman v. Branner,
72 Wash. 338, 130 Pac. 360 (1913), the court held the sale of a saloon business
within the act without mention of the problem under discussion, though the
subject matter of the transaction was the entire business, including the license
and good will. The statute has since been amended to cover fixtures whether or
not they are sold in connection with merchandise. WAsH. REV. CODE § 63.08.010
(1951).
31. Rice v. West, 80 Ore. 640, 157 Pac. 1105 (1916). The Oregon statute has
since been amended to include fixtures whether or not sold in connection with
merchandise. ORE. REV. STAT. § 79.010 (1953).
32. Nolte v. Winstanley, 16 Ariz. 327, 145 Pac. 246 (1914).
33. B. F. Goodrich Rubber Co. v. Breland, 170 Miss. 117. 154 So. 303 (1934);
Walton v. Walter Fisher Co., 146 Miss. 291, 111 So. 364 (1927).
34. 127 Ga. 303, 56 S.E. 460 (1907).
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of such business and the sale of the goods connected therewith, and
included in a sale with the goods, are a part of a 'stock of goods,
wares, and merchandise' .... "; Subsequently, several decisions of
the court of appeals have insisted that fixtures are covered by the act
only when sold in connection with merchandise, not otherwise.2' The
Maryland cases reached the same conclusion 37 under the earlier stat-
ute in that state.3
The decisions of the Georgia and Maryland courts seem clearly
erroneous as a matter of statutory construction. The words "stock of
goods, wares and merchandise" comprise a pln-ase which has a plain
and simple meaning to everyone, at least to the extent that it excludes
any item which is not intended to be sold as a regular part of the busi-
ness." The items which the Georgia courts include within what they
call "accessories,"' 0 and which other courts call fixtures, do not fit
within the meaning of such a well-understood phrase. Apparently this
is an example of a court's attempt to implement the legislative policy
in an area where the statutory language will not reasonably bear the
strain of the implementing interpretation.
[bi-[e]-[d] Under statutes which use the term fixtures or its equiv-
alent.
Many of the statutes refer to the transfer of a stock of goods (or a
stock of goods, wares and merchandise) and fixtures.42 Obviously there
35. Id. at 303, 56 S.E. at 461.
36. Bank of La Grange v. Rutland, 27 Ga. App. 442, 108 S.E. 821 (1921);
Martin v. Taylor, 24 Ga. App. 598, 101 S.E. 690 (1919). See also, Walters v.
Hagan, 53 Ga. App. 547, 186 S.E. 563 (1936), and Goodman v. Clarkson, 39 Ga.
App. 383, 147 S.E. 183 (1929), which reach the conclusion inevitably, in the light
of the above cases, that the sale of the fixtures of a business which has no stock of
merchandise is not interdicted by the statute.
37. Calvert Building & Construction Co. v. Winakur, 154 Md. 519, 141 AtL
355 (1928); Sakelos & Co. v. Hutchinson Brothers, 129 Md. 300, 99 AtL. 357
(1916).
38. MD. ANN. CODS art. 83, §§ 101-104 (Bagby 1924). The statute has since
been amended to cover fixtures whether sold in connection with merchandise or
not. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 83, § 97 (1951).
39. The limitation is employed to indicate awareness of the fact that the
meaning of the phrase is not clear from doubt in a certain number of limited
situations: e.g., does it include the finished products or raw materials of a
manufacturer, or repair parts when they are sold only in conjunction with ser-
vices connected with the use of the repair parts? The answers to such questions
are not clear, and the fact that the courts have arrived at different conclusions
does not amount to unwarranted judicial legislation on the part of some of them,
but rather to the normal and necessary performance of one of the most vital
functions of any court. To this writer, however, the inclusion of fixtures in a
definition of the phrase goes beyond the pale.
40. See, e.q., Martin v. Taylor, 24 Ga. App. 598, 101 S.E. 690 (1919).
41. ARK. STAT. ANN. . 68-1501 (1947); CoLO. STAT. ANN. c. 27, § I (Supp.
1952); IND. ANN. STAT. * 33-201 (Burns 1949); IowA CODE ANN. c. 555, § 555.1(1950); MrcH STAT. ANN. § 19.361 (1937); N.D. Rsv. CoDE § 51-0202 (1943);
S.D. CoDE A 54.0301 (1939); Tsx. Rav. Crv. STAT. ANN. art 4001 (1945); WYO.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 4 41-701 (1945). In addition the earlier statutes in New York
and Ohio were in this form. See, N.Y. Laws 1909, c. 45, § 44, as amended by
N.Y. Laws 1914, c. 507; Ohio Laws 1913, p. 462.
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is no way to construe such a statute so as to exclude fixtures from its
coverage when they are sold as a part of a transaction which also
includes merchandise. The only questions presented by the cases
decided under such statutes are those which arise when only fixtures
are sold, either of a mercantile business or a non-mercantile business,
and those questions will be discussed at a later point in this article. 42
Of course the same statement may be made with respect to all statutes
which use the term fixtures or some equivalent, or a broader term.43
(2). Are fixtures included if they are sold independently of any
merchandise?
(a) If the business is a mercantile business?
[a] Under statutes which make no mention of fixtures?
Since nearly all of the jurisdictions which have statutes which make
no reference to fixtures have concluded that the sale of fixtures is not
interdicted even in the situation where merchandise is also included
in the transaction,4" inquiry here is automatically limited to the three
non-conforming jurisdictions which either have or have had a statute
of the type under discussion, Georgia, Mar-yland"3 and Mississippi. 47
Furthermore, in the discussion of the Georgia cases as they related
to the problem of whether fixtures were covered under any circum-
stances, the conclusion was reached that the Georgia courts have con-
sistently held that fixtures are not included unless the transaction
also includes some merchandise.4 8 That is also the apparent, but less
clearly indicated, result of the Maryland cases.4 0
42. See text at § B, (2) (a) [b] infra.
43. In addition to those cited in note 41 supra, the following statutes presently
'employ fixtures or some equivalent: CAL. CIv. CODE § 3440.1 (Supp. 1953); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 6705 (1949); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 64-701 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT.
c. 121%, § 78 (Supp. 1953); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 58-101 (1949); KY. REV. STAT. §
377.010 (1953); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2961 (1950); MD. ANN. CODE GEN.
LAWS art. 83 § 97 (1951); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 427.020 (Vernon 1950); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. 18-201 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 36-501 (1952); NEV. Comp. LAWS
§ 6816 (Supp. 1949); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:29-1 (1940); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW
§ 44; OHio GEN. CODE ANN. § 11102 (1938); ORE. Rnv. STAT. § 79.010 (1963);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 521 (1931) (but subsequent to July 1, 1954, Article 6
of the Uniform Commercial Code will govern the law of bulk transfers in Penn-
sylvania); R.I. GEN. LAws c. 483, § 1 (1938); S.C. CODE § 11-201 (1952); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 25-2-1 (1953); VA. CODE § 55-83 (1950); WASH. REV. CODE § 63.08.-
010 (1951); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4001 (1949); Wis. STAT. § 241.18 (1951).
44. See notes 15-32 supra.
45. GA. CODE ANN. § 28-203 (1952).
46. Md. Laws 19, c. 579, § 18.
47. Miss. CODE ANN. § 274 (1942).
48. See notes 34-36 supra.
49. In Sakelos & Co. v. Hutchinson Brothers, 129 Md. 300, 304, 99 Atl. 357, 359(1916), the court placed some emphasis on the fact that "1... the assets and stock
... undoubtedly included 'goods, wares and merchandise' within the purview of
the statute... .' Emphasis was also placed on the fact that the transfer included
the stock for sale as food of a restaurant as bringing the case within the rule of
the Sakelos case in Calvert Bldg. & Constr. Co. v. Winakur, 154 Md. 519, 141 Atl.
355 (1928). Other language in the latter case contains a slight suggestion that
under a rule of liberal construction, the statute might be interpreted even more
Washington University Open Scholarship
BULK SALES
Only the Supreme Court of Mississippi has reached the conclusion
that the sale of fixtures alone is interdicted by this kind of statute.
The first case involving the sale of fixtures alone was Carnaggio Bros.
v'. City of Greenwood,- the holding of which is difficult to state pre-
cisely. The seller sold the good-will and fixtures of a restaurant busi-
ness, but nothing that was kept for resale in ordinary course of trade.
The exact language of the court in holding that the transaction did
not fall within the statute is:
We are of the opinion that [the bulk sales statute] . ..does not
apply to a business of this kind. The running of a restaurant is not
mercantile business within the meaning of this statute, where no
merchandise is sold in the sale of the business.51 [Italics added.]
The lack of precision is due, of course, to the italicized portion of the
quoted material, since it leaves uncertain whether a restaurant busi-
ness is not covered at all, or whether a restaurant business is covered
if the food on hand is sold but not where only fixtures are sold, and
whether if such a business is covered when the food is sold, a com-
bined sale of the fixtures and food would fall within the statute as to
both or only as to the food.
The following year the doubt as to whether fixtures would be in-
cluded under any circumstances was removed. In Walton v. Walter
Fisher Co.,='  the Court held that merchandise includes ". .. not only
the movable goods, but fixtures and other appliances used in connec-
tion with the conduct of the business ... ,33 Since both merchandise,
in the usual sense of the term, and fixtures were sold, the question of
whether the sale of fixtures alone was covered remained undecided.
However, in B. F. Goodrich Rubber Co. v. Breland,4 one of the pre-
viously unanswered questions was resolved. Defendant, the owner of
a filling station, returned his stock of merchandise to the persons
from whom he purchased it. He then sold the filling station, appar-
ently stripped of merchandise, to one Overstreet without complying
with the statute. In the one day which intervened between the reach-
ing of the agreement and the consummation of the sale, the defendant
continued to operate the station, having purchased, at Overstreet's
suggestion, oil and gasoline. The purchase price paid to defendant
was $789.62, of which Overstreet maintained that $500 was for the
fixtures and the remainder for the gasoline and oil purchased at
Overstreet's suggestion. In answer to Overstreet's contention that he
broadly, but the statute has since been amended to include fixtures, expressly,
whether or not they are part of a transaction also involving merchandise. MD.
ANN. CoDE GEN. LAWs art. 83, § 97 (1951).
50. 142 Miss 885, 108 So. 141 (1926).
51. Id. at 893, 108 So. at 142.
52. 146 Miss. 291, 111 So. 364 (1927).
53. Id. at 296, 111 So. at 365.
54. 170 Miss. 117, 154 So. 303 (1934).
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purchased only the fixtures from defendant and that defendant had
purchased the gasoline and oil referred to as agent for Overstreet,
the court said that it was immaterial whether the gasoline was pur-
chased by defendant as agent for Overstreet, since defendant
"... purchased it on his own credit, used it in his business, and it be-
came for all intents and purposes a part of his stock and [sic]
trade."55 However, the court went on to say, citing in support the
Walton case and treating the Carnaggio Bros. case as containing a
distinguishable dictum that:
In so far as the fixtures are concerned, it would be immaterial
whether any oil and gasoline were included in the sale to Over-
street, for fixtures used in connection wit& a mercantile business
are a part of the owner's "stock of merchandise," and within the
provisions of the Bulk Sales Law." [Italics added.]
Thus it can be readily seen that the fixtures of a mercantile business
are within the purview of the Mississippi statute, whether they are
sold along with merchandise or not. Although the statement in the
Carnaggio Bros. case that a restaurant business is not a mercantile
business where no merchandise accompanies the sale of fixtures, leaves
uncertain the question of whether the supplies of food in a restaurant
are merchandise, it seems clear that in addition to fixtures a business
must have some goods which can be described as merchandise, even
though they need not be sold along with the fixtures, in order for a
sale of the fixtures alone to come within the statute. The Mississippi
cases are subject to the same criticism leveled at the Georgia and
Maryland cases,57 but they have, up to a point, the merit of logical
consistency in that they do not say that fixtures are "merchandise"
if they accompany the "merchandise" in a sales transaction, but are
not "merchandise" if no "merchandise" is involved in the transac-
tion, although they may not be "merchandise" to a sufficient extent
to make up for the total lack of anything else in the business which
could bear that label. The criticism of the Maryland, Georgia and
Mississippi cases is not that they stopped short of full logical consis-
tency; it is rather that the basic decision that merchandise means
fixtures in any context is erroneous and that that error has led to the
necessity for drawing the line at a logically indefensible place.
55. Id. at 120, 154 So. at 303.
56. Ibid.
57. See text at notes 39-40 supra. For a similar criticism of the Mississippi
cases, see 7 MISS. L.J. 215 (1934). For a general discussion of the Mississippi
statute, see Satterfield, The Bulk Sales Law As Construed In Mississippi, 1 Miss.
LU. 422 (1929).
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[b] Under statutes which include merchandise and fixtures and
connect up the two by the conjunctive, thus, "merchandise
and fixtures."
It should be noted at the outset that the immediate inquiry relates
to the transfer of fixtures alone, but only to the fixtures of a business
which has a stock of goods, and so can be classified as a mercantile
business. Whether the transfer of the fixtures of a business which
has no merchandise falls within the statutes is discussed in an earlier
article,," for the solution to that problem is based on different con-
siderations. The language of the statutes of every jurisdiction which
has passed upon the precise point in question is substantially identi-
cal to that of each of the other such jurisdictions.59 The most signifi-
cant part of the statute for our purposes reads as follows:
The sale... in bulk.., of any part of or the whole of a stock of
merchandise, or merchandise and fixtures pertaining to the con-
duct of any such business .... "
As a matter of the normal meaning of words, it is arguable tenably
that if the goods covered include merchandise and fixtures, as they
clearly do, and if any part of the group of included items is a suffi-
cient quantity to bring the transaction within the statute, as it
clearly is, subject only to whatever quantitative implications the
phrases "in bulk" and "otherwise than in the ordinary course of
trade and in the regular prosecutioR of the business of the seller"
may carry, a transfer of the fixtures alone must be covered. To state
it differently: goods covered include both merchandise and fixtures;
an interdicted sale is one of any part of the goods covered; therefore,
a sale of fixtures alone is covered.62
58. Miller, aupra note 1, at section II, g.
59. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-1501 (1947); IND. ANN. STAT. § 33-201 (Burns
1949); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.361 (bulk sales), § 19.371 (bulk mortgages)
(1937); N.Y. Laws 1909, c. 45, * 44, as amended by N.Y. Laws 1914, c. 507 (The
New York bulk sales statute was amended in 1934 to read in part "... of any
part or the whole of a stock of merchandise or of fixtures, or merchandise and of
fixtures .. " N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 44); N.Y. LIEN LAW . 230a, which covers
the bulk mortgages situation, retains the older language; TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 4001 (1945). In addition the statutes of the following states employ the
same language but there have been no decisions under them relating to the problem
under discussion here: CoLO. STAT. ANN. c. 27, § 1 (Supp. 1952); IOWA CODE ANN.
c. 555, * 555.1; N.D. REv. CODE i 51-0202 (1943); S.D. CODE § 54.0301 (1939);
WYo. COMP. STAT. ANN. 4 41-701 (1945).
60. The quoted language is from ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-1501 (1947), but the
language of the other statutes which have been construed contains no material
variations. The same may be said of the other statutes cited in note 59 supra,
except the Iowa statute. IOWA CODE ANN. c. 555, § 55.1 (1950), reads simply
"... of any part or the whole of a stock of merchandise and the fixtures per-
taining to the conducting of said business .... " See text at note 73 infra, for
the suggestion that such a statute might well be interpreted to cover a transfer
of fixtures alone.
61. Admittedly this overlooks the important quantitative and qualitative limita-
tiong imposed by'the "in bulk" and "out of the ordinary course of trade" language,
but those lmitations are not important on the issue in question here. Their im-
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Such is, in effect, the rationale of the cases decided under the Mich-
igan statute.62 Although in the first case in Michigan raising the
point, the supreme court held that a chattel mortgage on the fixtures
of a bar was not within the statute, it is significant that the decision
was bottomed on the idea that a chattel mortgage was not a sale,
transfer or assignment within the statute, rather than that a transfer
of fixtures alone was not covered. 63 In Bowen v. Quigley," the sale
of the equipment, but not the merchandise, of a coal business was held
to fall outside the statute, but on the ground that the equipment did
not meet the test for fixtures; there was a concurring opinion based
on the ground that the selling of fixtures alone was outside the scope
of the statute.65
Michigan Packing Co. v. Messaris," however, is a clear decision
that the mortgaging of fixtures alone requires compliance with the
bulk mortgages statute, although the conclusion seems to have been
assumed, the primary question being whether a restaurant business
is covered in any of its aspects by the statute. And in Elliott Grocer
Co. v. Fiel's Pure Food Ma rket, Inc.,0 T the court rejected the conten-
tion that the sale of fixtures only of a mercantile business was not
covered by the bulk sales statute, relying on the Michigan Packing
Co. case and saying:
The bulk sales statute is aimed at preventing the sale otherwise
than in the regular course of trade of the visible assets of one who
in his business possesses and uses merchandise and fixtures.0 8
[Italics added.]
The court applied the rule of statutory construction which says
that "[w)henever it is reasonably necessary to accomplish the obvious
purpose of a statute the word 'and' may be read not only in the con-
junctive but also in the disjunctive.' 6Q1
Only one other case holding that a transfer of only fixtures under
a statute of this kind is covered has been found.70 In Huckins v.
portance is in terms of how much must be sold and under what circumstances,
problems which form the subject matter of a later article which will appear in the
June, 1954, issue of the Washington University Law Quarterly.
62. MICH. STAT. AN. § 19.361 (bulk sales), § 19.371 (bulk mortgages) (1937).
63. Hannah & Hogg v. Richter Brewing Co., 149 Mich. 220, 112 N.W. 713(1907). 'The Michigan Bulk Mortgages Statute was not enacted until 1929.
Mich. Acts 1929, no. 200. It was amended in 1931, Mich. Acts 1931, no. 198, and
is now MiCH. STAT. ANN. § 19.371 (1937).
64. 165 Mich. 337, 130 N.W. 690 (1911).
65. Id. at 340, 130 N.W. at 691.
66. 257 Mich. 422, 241 N.W. 236 (1932).
67. 286 Mich. 112, 281 N.W. 557 (1938).
68. Id. at 116, 281 N.W. at 558.
69. Id. at 115, 281 N.W. at 558.
70. But see, Brecht Co. v. Robinowitz, 275 S.W. 213 (Tex Civ. App. 1925).
That the case is not law in Texas today, see M System Stores, Inc. v. Johnston,
124 Tex. 238, 76 S.W.2d 503 (1934). The Texas cases are discussed in the text
at notes 81-88 infra.
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Smith,7' decided under the Arkansas statute, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a chattel mortgage on
the fixtures only of a men's clothing and furnishings business fell
within the statute. Since this is the only case in which the rationale
described above is stated in detail, it is worthy of quotation at length:
[The statute] . . . was intended to apply to the sale, transfer,
mortgage or assignment in bulk of any part or the whole of the
"stocks" therein described. Such stocks are described in the
following language: "A stock of merchandise or merchandise
and the fixtures pertaining to the conduct of any such business."
The application of the act was not confined in perhaps the usual
manner, to the term "stock of merchandise," which may, or may
not, under the divergent views we have just considered, include
fixtures. Reference was then made to another and more compre-
hensive stock, to wit, "merchandise and fixtures pertaining to
the conduct of any such business." Obviously the words "a stock
of" are to be read in after the word "or" and before the word
"merchandise" in the latter designation. So, then, we have the
act made to apply to a stock of merchandise and fixtures pertain-
ing to the conduct of any such business, and the mortgage in
bulk of any part of, or the whole of, such a stock composed of
both merchandise and fixtures, without complying with the re-
quirements of the statute, is prohibited.
It would seem obvious that the part of such a stock disposed
of may consist of merchandise alone or fixtures alone. -7 2
The language in question could, however, be interpreted differently.
Thus it is entirely reasonable to say that the repetition of the word
"merchandise" whenever the word "fixtures" is used is a clear in-
dication that fixtures fall within the statute only if they are part of
a transaction also involving merchandise. That is, the simpler and
perhaps more natural way to express the idea that the transfer of
either merchandise or fixtures alone is interdicted would be to say:
.. any part or the whole of a stock of merchandise and fixtures
. or "any part or the whole of a stock of merchandise or fixtures."
This, in effect, was the position taken in the cases decided under
the New York statute in force until 1934J as well as under the pres-
ent New York Bulk Mortgages Law.J In Heilmann v. Poweson 7
the court, following the previous holding to the same effect in Saqui
r. Wiricks,7 said:
[I] n my opinion the Bulk Sales Act does not apply here, as the
sale was of fixtures only and not of merchandise. It seems to me
71. 29 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1928).
72. Id. at 909.
73. This is the language of the Iowa statute, IOWA CoDE ANN. c. 555 § 555.1(1950), but there are no cases interpreting it.
74. N.Y. Laws 1909, c. 45, § 44, as amended by N.Y. Laws 1914, c. 507.
75. N.Y. LiEN LAw § 230a.
76. 101 Misc. 230, 167 N.Y. Supp. 662 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
77. 167 N.Y. Supp. 661 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
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that it was the plain intent of the legislature that the act should
apply to a sale of a stock of merchandise primarily, and also to in-
clude in the prohibition fixtures pertaining to the business if sold
in connection with the merchandise, but not to cover fixtures only.
The repetition of the word "merchandise" and the punctuation
of the paragraph, thus grouping "merchandise" with "fixtures"
at each mention of the word "fixtures," after having already re-
ferred separately to the stock of merchandise, to my mind shows
conclusively this intent.8
The same rule has been applied consistently by the federal courts
when called upon to interpret the Bulk Mortgages statute,8 and in
1935, the Supreme Court of New York indicated agreement with the
federal courts insofar as the Bulk Mortgages statute is concerned
in holding the statute inapplicable to a chattel mortgage on the fix-
tures only of a restaurant, but pointed out that since 1934 the Bulk
Sales statute covers a sale of fixtures alone.80
In M System Stores, Inc. v. Johnston,"' a different rationale for
excluding the transfer of fixtures alone was offered by the Supreme
Court of Texas. Emphasis was placed on the fact that following
the statutory language relating to the transfer of merchandise or
merchandise and fixtures was the statutory requirement that such
transfer be "... otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade, and
in the regular prosecution of the business of the seller or transferor.
.,,$82 Of this the court said:
It reasonably appears that these provisions primarily regard
sales of merchandise which are made "otherwise than in or-
dinary course of trade and in the regular prosecution of the busi-
ness of the seller or transferor." The provisions, in terms, deal
with fixtures only in relation to a sale or transfer of merchandise.
The terms of the provisions do not reasonably apply to fixtures
except in conjunction with merchandise, for otherwise the pro-
vision excluding sales and tra.nsfers made in the ordinary course
of trade and in the regular Prosecution of the business of the
seller would involve a contradiction in terms. For the business
of the seller could not be the selling of fixtures where he is not
engaged in such business; and he could not make a sale of fix-
tures in the regular prosecution of such business. It is only in
cases involving a sale of merchandise, by one engaged in that
business, that the provision respecting fixtures can have any ap-
plication at all.8 3 [Italics added.]
78. Heilmann v. Powelson, 101 Misc. 230, 231, 167 N.Y. Supp. 662 (Sup. Ct.
1917).
79. In re United Traveling Goods Co., 297 Fed. 823 (2d Cir. 1924); In Te
Laureate Co., Inc., 294 Fed. 668 (2d Cir. 1923). See also, In re Henningsen, 297
Fed. 821 (2d Cir. 1924); In re Handerson, 3 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1933); In re
Traymore Shoe Shops, Inc., 300 Fed. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
80. Atamian v. O'Leary, 154 Misc. 757, 278 N.Y. Supp. 218 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
81. 124 Tex. 238, 76 S.W.2d 503 (1934).
82. TEx. Rnv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4001 (1945).
83. M System Stores, Inc. v. Johnston, 124 Tex. 238, 243, 76 S.W.2d 503, 505(1934).
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Earlier cases interpreting the Texas statute were not uniform on
this point. In two early federal district court casess ' the same con-
clusion was reached as in the M System case. In one of them, Judge
Hutcheson found the answer to be plain from the statutory language,
saying:
The statute has employed plain and everyday language to ex-
press a thought not complex, but simple, that it shall be contrary
to law for a sale or transfer in bulk of any part or the whole of
the stock of merchandise, or merchandise and fixtures, to be
made, except under the conditions named in the statute. The
statute has not denounced a sale or transfer of fixtures apart
from the merchandise, and the court has no authority to read
into the statute a prohibition which the Legislature did not place
there. Nor, if the spirit and purpose of the Legislature be
searched, is it at all clear that the Legislature intended to bring
within the Bulk Sales Act, which was designed to reach fraudu-
lent sales of stocks of merchandise, a sale or transfer of fixtures
alone, where the merchandise was not involved. To my mind,
the evident purpose of the amendment[851 was, where a sale of
merchandise in bulk occurred, to make the purchaser take the
fixtures, if they were included in the sale, in the same case as he
took the merchandise. In other words, the Legislature attached
to the bulk sale of merchandise and fixtures the same stigma
which attached to bulk sales of merchandise alone, so that a pur-
chaser would take no good title to anything by that kind of a
sale.S
On the other hand, in Brecht Co. v. Robinowitz, 7 the court of civil
appeals devoted no discussion to the problem, holding that in any
event there was compliance with the statute, but all parties seemed
to have assumed the necessity for such compliance. However, in
Hobart Mfg. Co. v. Joyce & Mitchell,88 the court stated that a sale of
fixtures alone does not fall within the statute, although the decision
84. In re Gary, 281 Fed. 218 (S.D. Tex. 1922); In re Martin, 283 Fed. 833(E.D. Tex. 1921).
85. The reference to an amendment consists of the fact that the original
statute (Tex. Laws 1909, c. 27) applied only to a stock of merchandise, and that
in 1915 (Tex. Laws 1915, c. 114) the statute was amended to take its present
form.
86. I re Gary, 281 Fed. 218, 220 (S.D. Tex. 1921). The learned judge con-
tinued by pointing out the risk of a departure from the plain-meaning rule when
the statutory language is clear:
But in this view of what the Legislature intended this court may be en-
tirely wrong. I only instance it to show the danger in courts undertaking to
construe statutes as the trustee would have the court do, upon a supposed
intention of the Legislature, rather than upon the actual language which the
Legislature employed to express that intention.
Id. at 220.
87. 275 S.W. 213 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
88. 4 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). The Texas cases are discussed in
Larson, Bulk Sales: Texas Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 6 S.W.L.J.
417, 421 (1952).
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was that a bakery business does not in any event fall within the stat-
ute.89
Although the rationale offered by Judge Van Valkenburgh in the
Huckins case, which seems to be the basis for the decisions under the
Michigan statutes as well, is an appealing one from the viewpoint of
logic, yet it has an air of unreality; it neglects the strong contrary
inference to be derived from the unusual placement of words em-
phasized in the Heilmnn case, an inference which the writer believes
is compelled by a consideration of all of the language involved. While
the matter is not so clear of doubt as Judge Hutcheson would have
us believe, yet the result he reaches from an application of the plain-
meaning rule is justified on the basis of the New York rationale.
However, the rationale offered by the Supreme Court of Texas in the
M System, case seems unduly technical and is apparently based on a
very restrictive definition of the meaning of the "otherwise than in
the ordinary course of trade, and in the regular prosecution of the
business of the seller" language. Unless the court interprets that lan-
guage to mean that the sale of anything except merchandise is out
of the ordinary course of trade, because nothing except what is sold
on a day to day basis is sold in the ordinary course of trade, the ra-
tionale is indefensible. In a broader sense, and probably a more jus-
tifiable one considering the purpose of bulk sales legislation, the "out
of the ordinary course of trade" language is designed to exclude cer-
tain sales from the operation of the statute, where such sales are nor-
mal parts of the operation of the business. Certainly a businessman
would not regard the replacement of equipment, worn through use or
style change, with more modern and perhaps more functional equip-
ment, as an unusual thing for a merchant to do. Nor should the courts
so regard it, because the more probable reason for the phraseology is
to protect the purchaser of fixtures as well as the purchaser of mer-
chandise in the situation where the sale of fixtures is a normal action
of a businessman who wishes to improve his equipment, and, con-
versely, to include the fixtures as items covered where the seller is
selling out in one transaction or where the sale of the fixtures is part
of a plan of closing out the business. In short, the result of the M Sys-
tem case may be correct, but its rationale assumes the impossibility of
a situation existing which often does exist in fact.
[c] Under statutes which include merchandise and fixtures and
connect up the two with the disjunctive; thus, "merchandise
or fixtures."
The statutes in this general group have taken two forms, one of
which removes any question as to the inclusion within the coverage
89. The same result has been reached in Indiana, but no rationale was offered.
See Hughes-Curry Packing Co. v. Sprague, 200 Ind. 540, 165 N.E. 318 (1929).
Washington University Open Scholarship
BULK SALES
of the statute of the transfer of fixtures alone, the other of which
also covers the sale of fixtures alone but without such a precise stat-
utory command as in the former group. The latter group simply
applies to the transfer of a stock of merchandise or fixtures,90 while
the former uses more comprehensive language in substantially this
form: 1... any stock of goods, wares or merchandise of any kind, in
bulk, or fixtures, or any goods, wares or merchandise and fixtures.
. .." 1 While it might be contended that under the simpler form of
the statute, the "or" should be read as "and," none of the courts have
done so. Certainly such a contention is meaningless under the more
precise statutes, and apparently has not been raised in cases decided
under them. In any event, every case decided under this form of stat-
ute has reached the conclusion either expressly"2 or by implication, 9
that the sale of fixtures alone is covered by the statute.
("') Meaning of the term "fixtures" in bulk sales statutes.
Two general and, at least initially, different approaches have been
taken by the courts to the problem of defining the term "fixtures" as
used in bulk sales statutes. One group of courts has nominally as-
90. KAN. GEN. STAT. § 58-101 (1949) (. .. . any part or the whole of a stock
of merchandise or the fixtures pertaining thereto... ); Ky. •uy. STAT. § 377.010(1953) (..... the whole or a large part of any stock of goods, wares or merchan-
dise of any kind or fixtures in bulk ... ") ; VA. CODE § 55-83 (1950) (. ... any part
or the whole of a stock of merchandise or the fixtures pertaining to the conduct
of a business of selling merchandise.. .").
91. The quoted language is from the Maryland statute, MD. ANN. CODE GEN.
LAws art. 83, * 97 (1951). The following statutes also fall within this group:
CONN. GEN. STAT. 9 6705 (1949) ("... . stock of merchandise or of fixtures, or of
merchandise and fixtures . . ."); N.Y. Puns. PROP. LAW § 44 ("... stock of
merchandise or of fixtures, or merchandise and of fixtures . . ."); OHio GEN.
CODE ANN. § 11102 (1938) ("... . stock of merchandise, or merchandise and the
fixtures pertaining to the conducting of said business, or... of the fixtures per-
taining to the conducting of said business.. ."); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 521
(1931) ("... any stock of goods, wares, or merchandise of any kind, in bulk, or
fixtures, or any goods, wares, or merchandise of any kind and fixtures . . .");
R.I. GEN. LAws c. 483, § 1 (1938) (". . . stock of merchandise and fixtures, or
merchandise or fixtures . . ."); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4001 (1949) (". . . stock
of goods, wares and merchandise and/or fixtures, pertaining to..."); WIs. STAT.
4 241.18 (1951) (".... stock of goods, wares, and merchandise, or of the fixtures
pertaining to the same, or of such goods, wares and merchandise and fixtures
92. In re Elliott, 48 F. Supp. 146 (D.C. Kan. 1942) (Kansas statute); Sproul
v. Gambone, 43 F. Supp. 575 (W.D. Pa. 1942) (Pennsylvania statute); Maley
v. Blakeney, 184 Misc. 705, 54 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Carl Ahlers, Inc.
v. Dingott, 173 Misc. 873, 18 N.Y.S.2d 434 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (recognizing that the
1934 amendment to the bulk sales statute nullified the cases of Saqui v. Wiricks,
167 N.Y. Supp. 661 (Sup. Ct. 1917), and Heilmann v. Powelson, 101 Misc. 230,
167 N.Y. Supp. 662 (Sup. Ct. 1917)); The Union National Bank of Mahanoy
City v. Garvey, 29 Pa. D. & C. 638 (C.P. 1936).
93. In re Dederick, 91 F.2d 646 (10th Cir. 1937) (Kansas statute); The Citi-
zens State Bank of Hiawatha v. Rogers, 155 Kan. 478, 126 P.2d 214 (1942);
Stockyards Petroleum Co. v. Bedell, 128 Kan. 549, 278 Pac. 739 (1929). See also,
Flushing National Bank in New York v. Abrams, 270 App. Div. 911, 61 N.Y.S.2d
609 (2d Dep't 1946), af'd without opinion 296 N.Y. 1009, 73 N.E.2d 582 (1947).
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signed to that term a meaning derived from the common law of that
"now it's land, now it's chattel" hybrid called a fixture, and more par-
ticularly to that branch of it known as the law of "trade" or "ten-
ant's" fixtures. In fact one of the statutes describes the fixtures to
which it pertains as "trade" fixtures,' and many others require that
the fixtures relate to the conduct of the business or its merchandise. 0
The effect of the inclusion of the modifying language in any par-
ticular statute cannot be demonstrated from a study of the cases,
however.
That approach has inevitably resulted in difficulties, inevitably be-
cause of the historical development of the common law of fixtures
which caused that body of law to be described in terms of confusion
and chaos.90 At least part of that confusion is caused by the fact that
the word "fixtures" has been used in many senses, some of them con-
tradictory in that the attachment of the label has led to one con-
clusion in one kind of case and an exactly opposite one in another
kind. More specifically, the evolution of that branch of the law took
the following pattern. 7
Basically "fixture" means something attached to land, and it is cer-
tainly true that in the English as well as the American cases, the
word has been used to describe the legal conclusion that the object
about which the particular dispute centered was to be treated as land
for the purpose with which the litigation was concerned. In the early
cases the most significant fact which caused what might otherwise
be classified as a chattel to be treated as realty was that the object
was somehow physically annexed to the land, usually by screws, bolts,
94. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 18-201 (1947).
95. The following statutes all contain in some form the idea that the fixtures
must somehow "pertain to" the merchandise or the conducting of the business:
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-1501 (1947); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6705 (1949); COLO. STAT.
ANN.'c. 27, § 1 (Supp. 1952); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 64-701 (1948); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 33-201 (Burns 1949); IOWA CODE ANN. c. 555, § 555.1 (1950); KAN. GEN.
STAT. § 58-101 (1949); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2961 (1950); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 19.361 (bulk sales), § 19.371 (bulk mortgages) (1937) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§18-201 (1947); NEB. REv. STAT. § 36-501 (1952); Nuv. CoiP. LAWs § 6816(Supp. 1949); N.Y. PEs. PROP. LAW § 44 (bulk sales); N.Y. Liux LAW § 230a
(bulk mortgages); N.D. REV. CODE § 51-0202 (1943); OHIO GEN. Coft ANN. §
11102 (1938); S.C. CODE § 11-201 (1952); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 4001(1945); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-2-1 (1953); VA. CODE § 55-83 (1950); WASH. REV.
CODE § 63.08.010 (1951); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4001 (1949); WIS. STAT. § 241.18
(1951); WYO. COmp. STAT. ANN. § 41-701 (1945). However, it is highly dubious
that language of that kind aids in the solution of the problem of what fixtures
are, though it is arguable that the language might provide an impetus for ex-
tending the meaning of the word beyond its common law definition. While the
rationales offered in the cases give no such indication, yet the results of most
of them are consistent with it. See text at notes 98-142 infra.
96. See, EWELL, A TmATSE ON THE LAW OF FIXTURES, Preface (2d ed. 1905).
97. The capsule treatment given in the text is the author's condensation of the
excellent discussions found in the following sources: BROWN, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF PERSONAL PROrERy c. 16 (1936); Bingham, Some Suggestions Concern-
ing the Law of Fixtures, 7 COL. L. REV. 1 (1907); Niles, The Rationale of the
Law of Fixtures: English Cases, 11 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 560 (1934).
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or even cement. If physical annexation in that restricted sense could
not be found, the object was treated as personalty.
Concurrently with that development, and as a part of it, the law
of trade fixtures developed. Certainly in the beginning, the law of
trade fixtures was an exception to the general law of fixtures. For
the most part it consisted of cases which held that a tenant was en-
titled to the property as his chattel in spite of the fact that the test
of physical annexation could be met. But it is impossible to over-
emphasize the fact that before the question of whether a particular
object was a fixture became legally significant, it was essential that
the disputed object have some characteristics to support an argument
that it should be treated as part of the land for the purpose of decid-
ing the particular issue in the case at hand. To illustrate: A counter
in a retail store which is bolted to the store floor is at least sufficiently
"annexed to the realty" to support an argument that it should be
treated as realty, but a cash register not fastened at all is just a plain
unadorned chattel, and there can be no serious contention of a type
which could have any bearing on the result of litigation that it was a
part of the land. Consequently it should not bear the additional clas-
sifying name of trade fixture; "chattel" alone fully describes it.
At the same time that the category of things classified as trade
fixtures was growing, other cases with different issues between parties
standing in a different relation to each other from that of landlord
and tenant were being decided. In those cases the concept, that it
was not necessary for something to be annexed to the land in order
for it to be treated as part of the realty, at least in as definite and
clear-cut fashion as in the early cases, was replacing the older more
rigid concept, with the result that an increasing number of things
were classified as fixtures for the purpose of treating them like land
for some purpose important to the litigants. Thus courts were simul-
taneously classifying objects as "fixtures" in order to treat them for
some purposes as land, and classifying other objects as "trade fix-
tures" in order to treat them as "not-land" for some other purpose
or as to some other parties. Finally, and of great significance, is the
fact that courts have used, and are using all too frequently, the un-
modified term "fixtures" to describe both of the above classes, a situa-
tion which obtained at the time of the passage of bulk sales statutes
and to a large extent still obtains.
As a result of that background it is not surprising to find an early
Michigan case,18 which is the genesis for the restrictive definition of
fixtures, emphasizing the annexation aspect in order to classify a par-
ticular object as a fixture. In that case the owner of a coal-yard sold
98. Bowen v. Quigley, 165 Mich. 337, 130 N.W. 690 (1911).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1954/iss2/2
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
everything except the merchandise, i.e., the coal. Included in the sale
were wagons, horses, harness, horse covers, coal bags, forks, shovels,
coal screens, baskets, a desk, safe, chairs, chutes and the books of the
business. The court held that since none of the enumerated articles
was capable of annexation to the premises, they were not fixtures. In
so doing the court rejected the contention that the words "... . per-
taining to the conducting of said business.. ."19 should be held to
broaden the meaning of the statute to ". .. include the furniture,
tools, vehicles, and appliances which were used in and about the
conducting of.. ."10 the business. The court said:
Inasmuch as this law is aimed at the business of merchants, we
think the word "fixtures," as used in the statute, must have ref-
erence to such chattels as merchants usually possess and annex
to the premises occupied by them, to enable them the better to
store, handle, and display their goods and wares. Such chattels
when annexed to the premises become fixtures. They are gen-
erally removed without material injury to the premises at or be-
fore the end of the tenancy. They are sometimes called trade
fixtures.
We are not persuaded that the legislature has indicated by the
language made use of that it intended the word "fixtures" should
have any other or different meaning than is usually given to it
in the relation of landlord and tenant. It is probably true that
the act could be made more effective if we were to give the word
"fixtures" the enlarged meaning claimed for it, but we do not
feel that the language of the statute will justify us in so doing.101
Obviously the court felt that the term, "fixtures," had at least a suf-
ficient common law idea content to prevent much judicial freedom
in shaping its meaning under the bulk sales statute, and that one
important factor in that common law meaning was that the object
had to be capable of and ordinarily attached to realty in order that
the placing of the label "fixture" on it should have legal significance.
A secondary idea, inherent in the Bowen definition, which later as-
sumed great importance, was that the purpose of the object be to
store, handle and display goods. Adherence to and emphasis on the
"capability of annexation" aspect of the definition continued through
the case of People's Savings Bank v. Van Allsburg, 102 in which case
the court held that a funeral car, casket wagon, harness, buggy "and
other impedimenta" of an undertaking business were not fixtures.
In Hoa v. Motoo,103 though the Bowen case was cited with ap-
proval, the requirement of capability of annexation to the premises
was departed from in fact. There the stock of a grocery and meat
99. MiCH. STAT. ANN. § 19.361 (1937).
100. Bowen v. Quigley, 165 Mich. 337, 339, 130 N.W. 690, 691 (1911).
101. I& at 339, 340, 130 N.W. at 690, 691.
102. 165 Mich. 524, 131 N.W. 101 (1911).
103. 235 Mich. 958, 209 N.W. 66 (1926).
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market as well as a cash register, large refrigerator, computing scale,
marble counter, large press, 30 gallon kettle and stove, meat block,
safe, account file, sausage mill and other things were sold. Although
the court held that all of the above items constituted fixtures under
the Bowen test, it must be recognized that a safe was held not to be
a fixture in the Bowen case, but was included in the Hoja case. But
of greater import are the fact that several of the enumerated items
simply do not meet the test of capability of annexation to the premises
and the fact that capability of annexation as the criterion is nowhere
mentioned in the Hojc opinion. The emphasis instead was clearly on
the reason for the merchant's possessing the objects in question.
The following year saw the case of McPartin v. ClarksonW4 decided.
There the owner of a pool room and cigar and candy stand sold the
pool tables and the stock of tobacco and candy without complying
with the statute. A creditor levied on two of the pool tables which
were sold by the defendant sheriff. The action was by the non-com-
plying purchaser of the tables against the sheriff for conversion. In
holding for the plaintiff, the court refused to treat the tables as fix-
tures because they ". . are not such chattels as tobacco and candy
merchants or either of them 'usually possess and annex to the prem-
ises occupied by them to enable them the better to store, handle and
display their goods and wares.' " °5 Although the usualness of an-
nexation aspect is not present in this case, the capability of annexation
aspect is, but the purpose for which the pool tables were kept was not
in any sense to facilitate merchandising. It is apparent, regardless of
whether the court adheres to the annexation requirement in either or
both of its forms, that it is essential that the chattel be kept for the
purpose of aiding in the handling, storage and display of goods; that
is the sine qita non of the definition.
Although the full Bowen definition was quoted as controlling in
Patrws v. Grand Rapids Dairy Co.,08 the point in issue was whether
the business involved was a merchandising business at all. It is sig-
nificant that the court made no effort to distinguish the various items
which formed the subject matter of the transaction in terms of in-
clusion and exclusion, although such widely different items as milk
bottles and milk bottle caps on the one hand and pasteurizing ma-
chinery on the other were included. Clearly milk bottle caps cannot
meet the annexation test. The annexation aspect of the Bowen test
was further weakened in Michigan Packing Co. v. Messaris,7oT where
the court found a chattel mortgage on " . . chairs, tables, dishes,
104. 240 Mich. 390, 215 N.W. 338 (1927).
105. Id. at 392, 215 N.W. at 339.
106. 243 Mich. 417, 220 N.W. 724 (1928).
107. 257 Mich. 422, 241 N.W. 236 (1932).
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stoves, cooking utensils, etc. .. ." of a restaurant to be ".... clearly
within the term 'fixtures' as defined by previous decisions. .. 0,,08
citing only the Patmos case, however. Certainly most of the listed
items do not meet the test of annexation laid down in the Bowen case
and quoted over and over again in subsequent cases. Although the
Bowen definition was again quoted in full in the case of Flint Citizens
Loan & Investment Co. v. Moss,0 9 it is clear from a consideration of
the case that the purpose of the owner in possessing the chattels
which formed the subject matter of the sale was the controlling ele-
ment. The case turned on the issue of whether non-mercantile busi-
nesses were covered by the bulk mortgage statute, the business in
question being an insurance business. In holding that such busi-
nesses were not covered at all, the court pointed out that while a sale
of fixtures alone is interdicted by the statute, the fixtures must be
those used in connection with a mercantile establishment.
Finally a dictum in the most recent Michigan case" speaking to
the question causes speculation as to whether it is still necessary that
the chattel be used to store, handle or display merchandise, the an.
nexation aspect having been fairly clearly abandoned. There, what
everyone seemingly conceded to be fixtures of a mercantile establish-
ment were sold. Although the holding of the case is simply that a
sale of fixtures only is interdicted by the statute, in the course of the
opinion, relying wholly on the Patmos decision and without citing any
of the other cases, the court made this statement:
The bulk sales statute is aimed at preventing the sale otherwise
than in the regular course of trade of the visible assets of one who
in his business possesses and uses merchandise and fixtures. "
[Italics added.]
From all this we may conclude that the annexation aspect of the
Bowen definition has been discarded, and further that the require-
ment that the chattel be on hand to better store, handle or display
merchandise may have been weakened by the most recent case, al-
though not many things would be included in the phrase "visible
assets" that would be excluded under the Bowen definition stripped
of its annexation requirements.
Elsewhere the Bowen case has been cited and its definition appar-
ently accepted,11 2 but only in Texas has its impact been significant."'
108. Id. at 423, 241 N.W. at 236.
109. 265 Mich. 40, 251 N.W. 347 (1933).
110. Elliott Grocer Co. v. Field's Pure Food Market, Inc., 286 Mich. 112, 281N.W. 557 (1938).
111. Id. at 116, 281 N.W. at 558.
112. Gaspee Cab Inc. v. McGovern, 51 R.I. 247, 153 Atl. 870 (1931). There the
Howen definition was cited with approval, but the issue in the case was whether
a fleet of taxicabs fell within the statute, an issue the resolution of which should
be in terms of whether the business was an included one rather than whether the
subject matter of the transaction fell within a definition of fixtures.
113. Yeager v. Dallas Coffin Co., 46 S.W.2d 1016 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
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In Yeager v. Dallas Coffin Co.,24 the court found that "'... 1 casket
throw, 1 half couch, 1 desk, 1 office suit, 1 typewriter, 2 church trucks,
and 1 cooling board...' " of an undertaking establishment did not
constitute fixtures, relying on the Bowen definition. The court stated
that:
Those articles were purchased, rather, to be retained and used
in conducting the merchant's general business as a dealer in
caskets and accessories and in performing personal services in
his profession as an undertaker.110
When it is considered that the court took the position that the under-
taking business is covered by the Texas Bulk Sales Statute,17 it be-
comes obvious that considerable importance was attached to the tech-
nical definition of fixtures which contemplates something capable of
annexation to realty as well as suitability for trade purposes.
The same restrictive view apparently obtains in Wisconsin, al-
though the leading Wisconsin case" 8 is not clear on the test for in-
clusion. A soft drink and lunch parlor was sold, but only an insignif-
icant part of the transaction's subject matter consisted of merchan-
dise. In upholding a trial court finding that the total value of the
merchandise and fixtures was less than the seller's statutory exemp-
tion, the court excluded such things as chairs, trays, cups, plates,
saucers and a player-piano used to entertain customers, saying that
bulk sales statutes ". . . were not intended to restrict the sale in bulk
of articles used by the seller in carrying on his trade or business and
which are necessary to enable him to enjoy the fruits of his own
labor.""' , Apparently the court was willing to consider the business as
an included one (though a very recent case makes it clear that the
present Wisconsin Supreme Court would not so rule) '12 so the con-
clusion is inevitable that some test other than that finally adopted in
Michigan will be used to determine what fixtures are under the Wis-
consin statute. What that test may turn out to be is uncertain, but
it may be safely hazarded, in the light of the unusually restrictive
treatment which the Wisconsin court has accorded its statute, that
it will be a narrow one. z2
On the other hand some of the courts have preferred to disregard
the common law connotations of the word fixtures, and have indicated
that a "nontechnical" definition' 22 is proper under bulk sales statutes.
114. Ibid.
115. Id. at 1018.
116. Ibid.
117. Tnx. Rmr. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4001 (1945).
118. Missos v. Spyros, 182 Wis. 631, 197 N.W. 196 (1924).
119. Id. at 635, 197 N.W. at 197.
120. State Bank of Viroqua v. Jackson, 261 Wis. 538, 53 N.W.2d 433 (1952).
121. Ibid. The Wisconsin statute is discussed in Note, 1947 WIS. L. REN. 458.
122. See, e.g., In re Elliott, 48 F. Supp. 146 (D.C. Kan. 1942).
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The two cases which contain the most definitive statements of this
idea were decided in New York in the same year, 1945. In Maley v.
Blakeney,12 the seller had a small coal business, in connection with
which he operated four trucks and three trailers constituting almost
his entire equipment. He sold the trucks and trailers without com-
pliance with the statute. After finding uncertainty and conflict in the
cases which attempted definitions of the term "fixtures," the court,
relying on the case of Stockyards Petroleum Co. v. Beell,1'24 reached
the conclusion that the trucks and trailers were fixtures since they
were used to handle the wares, and that "[t]he nontechnical use of
the term 'is the sensible interpretation which ought to be applied.' 10125
Two months later the Appellate Division sustained, as against a
motion to dismiss, a complaint which alleged that the seller was en-
gaged in the business of buying up and selling pulp wood and that
he had sold, without complying with the statute, all the property he
owned and used in conducting the business, including his stock of
"manufactured wood.1126 In so ruling the court defined "fixtures" as
used in the statute as ". . . all such things as are customarily and
necessarily employed in the trade or traffic of the merchandise."'
12
Attention is directed to the fact that one of the cases principally
relied on in the Maley case was decided by the Supreme Court of
Kansas. 28 There, one who owned a filling station and the land on
which it was located sold the merchandise on hand and "miscellaneous
unattached appliances" to one person, and deeded the real estate to
another. The gasoline pumps, tanks, air compressors, and similar
appliances which were attached to the realty were treated by the
parties as passing with the realty under the deed. The issue in the
case was whether these attached items came within the bulk sales
statute, which was not complied with. In holding that those items
constituted fixtures under the statute, the court demonstrated a re-
luctance to be bound by technical common law rules relating to fix-
tures, but nevertheless discussed the problems in terms of factors
which take their main significance from the fixtures rules, primarily
the factor of removability. In passing, however, the court quoted with
approval plaintiff's argument that:
[T] he "nontechnical use of the word 'fixture' seems to be the
sensible interpretation which ought to be applied. Otherwise we
become lost in the shifting rules as to what is removable, for ex-
123. 184 Misc. 705, 54 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
124. 128 Kan. 549, 278 Pac. 739 (1929).
125. Maley v. Blakeney, 184 Misc. 705, 708, 54 N.Y.S.2d 68, 71 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
126. Davignon v. Raquette River Paper Co., 269 App. Div. 889, 56 N.Y.S.2d 249
(3d Dep't 1945).
127. Id. at 889, 56 N.Y.S.2d at 250.
128. Stockyards Petroleum Co. v. Bedell, 128 Kan. 549, 278 Pac. 739 (1929).
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ample, as between landlord and tenant, mortgagor and mortgagee,
and heir and executor, so that no creditor would ever know upon
what to rely."'
This language became the basis for the decision in the Maley case
discussed, supra, and had an important impact on later cases decided
under the Kansas statute.
In Joyce v. Armourdale State Bank,'" the question was whether a
chattel mortgage previously held invalid for failure to comply with
the bulk sales statute was also invalid as to a truck used to deliver
merchandise. The court, in holding that the mortgage was valid as
to the truck had this to say:
Appellant argues that the truck... is a fixture within the mean-
ing of the bulk-sales law, but he cites no authorities in support
of that view. Authorities cited by appellee (People's Sav. Bank
o. Van Allsbuwg,... and cases there cited) are to the contrary.
But we do not rest our ruling on that point alone. 131
The court went on to point out that in any event the truck was exempt
property in the hands of the mortgagor and hence not covered by the
statute. Here is an instance of the Kansas court's relying on a case
with a restrictive definition of fixtures to come to a result consistent
only with some common law notion of the meaning of the term. It is
significant that the Stockyards Petroleum Co. case was not cited in
the opinion.
Finally, in the course of the opinion in In re Elliott,132 the court
indicated that the Kansas definition of fixtures was a broad one and
nontechnical in nature, relying primarily on the Stockyards Petro-
leum Co. case, but the Elliott case is a highly unusual one in that the
nontechnical nature of the Kansas definition was utilized to exclude
what would clearly have been a fixture at common law, even under
the most rigid test, since it was a substantial building which the
tenant had a right to remove under the terms of the lease. Thus it
can be seen that a departure from common law fixtures concepts may
result in exclusion as well as in inclusion of certain objects. Of the
cases which have construed the Kansas statute, it may be said that
only the Joyce case stands in the way of our concluding that there
has been a full departure from the common law definition, but it is
important to note that that case is the last word on the subject from
the Supreme Court of Kansas. It is, however, impossible to reconcile
the Joyce case with the broad language of the Stockyards Petroleum
Co. case.
Uncertainty also exists in the Pennsylvania cases. The only state-
129. Id. at 551, 278 Pac. at 740.
130. 130 Kan. 147, 285 Pac. 525 (1930).
131. Id. at 148, 285 Pac. at 525.
132. 48 F. Supp. 146 (D.C. Kan. 1942). And see, Ir re Dederick, 91 F.2d 646(10th Cir. 1937).
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ment by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on the subject is a dictum
found in a 1930 case, the holding of which was that a manufactory
was not covered by the statute. 33 In passing, the court defined fixtures
as "... evidently those which belong to the business, like trade fix-
tures, and not to the building."' 3' Obviously we cannot be sure
whether the court means that fixture under the bulk sales act means
a trade fixture, or whether it is a broader word which not only in-
cludes trade fixtures, but also includes things which are like trade
fixtures in the sense that they are chattels other than merchandise
used to facilitate merchandising. Subsequent lower court and federal
decisions have not fully resolved the doubt.
In The Union National Bank of Mahanoy City v. Garvey,23' a situa-
tion identical to that posed by the Elliott case was presented. De-
fendant was the proprietor of a filling station located on a piece of
leased land. Under the terms of the lease, the defendant was per-
mitted to remove the building erected on the leased ground. Defend-
ant sold the building as well as all other chattels used in the business.
What was sold and the court's attitude toward proper classification
of the various items may be gleaned from the following language:
The fixtures which are intended are those which belong to the
business like trade fixtures, and the articles which [defendant]
... sold were fixtures belonging to the business. The building
constituting his service station was personal property and a
necessary fixture in the prosecution of the .business of selling
gasoline and oil. The showcases, the sections of wall cases and
shelving, the heatrola, the cash register, the chairs, and the light-
ing fixtures and shades, all of which were sold, unquestionably
were trade fixtures used in the business. The equipment also
included in the sale, such as grease guns, car jacks, air compres-
sors, air hose and gauges, and miscellaneous tools, may all have
been of use in the business of selling gasoline and oil.1 0 [Italics
added.]
Here it is clear that the court thought that fixtures under the bulk
sales statute included not only trade fixtures, but also chattels which
were like trade fixtures in the sense that they were useful in the busi-
ness of merchandising.
Sproul v. Gambone'37 is another example of a willingness to depart
from common law definitions of fixtures. There the federal district
court held that cigarette-vending machines which were placed by their
owner in hotels and candy stores throughout western Pennsylvania,
and which served as the outlets for the owner's retail sales of tobacco,
133. Gitt v. Hoke, 301 Pa. 31, 151 Atl. 585 (1930).
134. Id. at 34, 151 Atl. at 585.
135. 29 Pa. D. & C. 638 (C.P. 1936).
136. Id. at 640. And see, Robbins v. Fuller, 148 Ark. 173, 229 S.W. 8 (1921);
B. F. Goodrich Rubber Co. v. Breland, 170 Miss. 117, 154 So. 303 (1934).
137. 43 F. Supp. 575 (W.D. Pa. 1942).
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were fixtures. The court, after holding that the machines were not
themselves merchandise because they were not usually bought and
sold, went on to say:
[It seems perfectly plain that the cigarette-vending machines
are fixtures within the meaning of the [Bulk Sales] Act.... In
view of the fact that these machines were used by the bankrupt
in his business of selling cigarettes, they must be regarded as
fixtures. These machines served as storage cases for the ciga-
rettes, and as cash boxes for the bankrupt in connection with
his retail cigarette business. The fact they were distributed in
different locations does not alter their character. Today many
commodities that in the past were sold over counters in stores are
now being sold tuough vending machines placed in all types of
public places for the purpose of making such commodities more
available to the consuming public.'
Here again, the court showed a willingness to treat as fixtures
everything which a merchant uses to facilitate the further distribution
of his merchandise. However, a very recent case decided by the
superior court"O plus the fact that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has not spoken to the point since the Gitt case,1 4 0 cast some doubts on
the conclusion which could fairly be derived from the lower court and
federal cases. In Smith v. Munizza,141 a beer distributing business,
consisting of ". . . 'the beer on hand, a list of customers, the office
furniture, and a truck'... ,"" was sold. The court included the beer
and excluded the list of customers, but declined to say whether the
truck was a fixture since the issue was not raised by the parties. This
gratuitous remark, offered by the court without apparent prompting
by counsel, should serve as some warning that the law in Pennsylvania
on this point is not so well settled that the definition of fixtures is
as broad as the cases discussed have indicated. It seems clear, how-
ever, that the Pennsylvania courts on the whole have given the term
a broad meaning and that the Union National Bank case is perhaps
the most liberal case as a matter of actual decision on the point in
the United States.
In those jurisdictions which have interpreted their statutes to in-
clude things other than merchandise even though the particular
statutes make no mention of fixtures, the extension has been a liberal
one. In Georgia, the courts have used the term "accessories" to de-
scribe the included non-merchandise items and have defined accesso-
ries as including the usual and customary things used in connection
138. Id. at 576. And see, Bac Corporation v. Welsh, 33 DeL Co. R. 113 (1944).
139. Smith v. Munizza, 170 Pa. Super. 122, 84 A.2d 352 (1951).
140. Gitt. v. Hoke, 301 Pa. 31, 151 Atl. 585 (1930).
141. 170 Pa. Super. 122, 84 A.2d 352 (1951).
142. Id. at 123, 84 A.2d at 353.
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with a business to which they are appropriate.143 In one case144 this
included bar fixtures, safes, desks, cash registers, cigar cases, pool
tables and a refrigerator. And in two other cases,141 the holdings of
which were that the entire transaction fell outside the scope of the
statute because no merchandise, as we ordinarily define that term, was
included, the items that were sold would apparently have been con-
sidered as falling within the statute had some merchandise been
included in the transaction. In one of the cases,", these included all
sorts of shoe repairing machines and equipment, and in the other 14T
all the equipment of a coal yard including such things as mules,
wagons, harness, and tools of various sorts useful in the business.1 48
Several conclusions may be fairly drawn from this study of what
things courts have treated as fixtures. First of all, the word fixtures
initially seems to have a definite common law idea content, which
may have been in the minds of the legislators, at the time the statutes
were passed. Certainly the common law was and is replete with cases
dealing with the problem of fixtures. The difficulty which arose, how-
ever, was that there was too much inconsistent idea content to be
found in the common law decisions. As we have seen, "fixture" could
mean, in terms of result at least, "land." On the other hand it could
mean "not land." Furthermore, although the special label "trade"
when attached to fixtures meant that the object was to be treated as
a chattel, the draftsmen of the bulk sales statutes did not attach the
modifier. An ambiguity thus existed, but an ambiguity which could
be partially resolved without much difficulty from a consideration of
the over-all purpose and plan of the statutes. Thus it was clear that
if the choice lay between assigning a meaning to the term which re-
sulted in the statute's covering only such things as at common law
were sufficiently closely related to the realty to be classified as land on
the one hand, and on the other hand the meaning which is conveyed
by the term "trade fixtures," both the purpose of the legislation, the
context of the term, and not unimportantly, common sense, dictated
that the choice be the latter one.
But that was only a partial solution of the problem. Once it was
143. Cooney, Eckstein & Co. v. Sweat, 133 Ga. 511, 66 S.E. 257 (1909); Parham
& Co. v. Potts-Thompson Liquor Co., 127 Ga. 303 56 S.E. 460 (1907); Bank of
LaGrange v. Rutland, 27 Ga. App. 442 (1921); Martin v. Taylor, 24 Ga. App.
598 (1919).
144. Parham & Co. v. Potts-Thompson Liquor Co., 127 Ga. 303, 56 S.E. 460
(1907).
145. Harris v. Kilgore, 56 Ga. App. 516, 193 S.E. 179 (1937); Martin v.
Taylor, 24 Ga. App. 598 (1919).
146. Harris v. Kilgore, 56 Ga. App. 516, 193 S.E. 179 (1937).
147. Martin v. Taylor, 24 Ga. App. 598 (1919).
148. See also, Calvert Building & Construction Co. v. Winakur, 154 Md. 519, 141
Atl. 355 (1928) ; B. F. Goodrich Rubber Co. v. Breland, 170 Miss. 117, 154 So. 303
(1934).
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decided that the statutes referred to trade fixtures, the question arose
as to whether the term did not have an even broader meaning, e.g.,
accessories or equipment. It must be remembered that in order for
the label "trade fixture" to be attached to a chattel, the chattel had
somehow to be enough a part of the realty so that an argument could
be made that it ought to be treated as land, though the argument, of
course, had to be unsuccessful. Apparently the early Michigan cases,
as well as some of the others, drew the line at just that point, for the
Bowen definition surely contemplates that the article must be one
both capable of annexation and usually annexed to realty. In so con-
cluding, the MIichigan court is not subject to extensive criticism,
though perhaps the exercise of a little more imagination and a some-
what greater understanding of the purpose of bulk sales legislation
would have led them immediately to take the broader view of the
matter which they eventually did take.
On the other hand, those courts which faced the issue at a later
point in time, a time when the bulk sales statutes over the nation had
been more extensively construed and were, perhaps, better understood
by both lawyers and courts, took the next step. They adopted the
position that while trade fixtures were undoubtedly included, the term
in its context was broader, and that those things which were kept by
merchants as useful in the business but which did not quite meet the
more rigid tests for trade fixtures, nevertheless were to be included,
because they logically fell into the same class for bulk sales purposes.
It must be remembered that bulk sales statutes were not enacted to
settle disputes between landlords and tenants as to the ownership
of pieces of property; they were designed to prevent creditors from
losing those things which served as the real basis for the credit ex-
tension. Especially was this true in situations where the credit was
unsecured. With the notable exceptions discussed in the text, it may
be said that courts are no longer tied to the common law conceptions
of the nature of a fixture. They have rather evolved a definition
which takes into account adequately the situation which gave rise
to bulk sales legislation, the general nature of the adopted solution
and the context in which the disputed word is used.
(4) Statutes containing more inclusive language than "fixtures."
Thirteen statutes14 9 contain language which is more clearly inclu-
sive of various kinds of chattels than that of other statutes, but one
149. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3440.1 (Supp. 1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 64-701 (1948);
ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 121%, § 78 (Supp. 1953); LA. RV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2961
(1950); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 427.010 (Vernon 1950); MONT. REv. CoDEs ANN.
* 18-201 (1947); NEB. REv. STAT. § 36-501 (1952); Nm-. Comp. LAWS § 6816(Supp. 1949); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:29-1 (1940); OrX. REV. STAT. § 79.010(1953); S.C. CODE § 11-201 (1952); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-2-1 (1953); WAsH.
RFV. CODE 4 63.08.010 (1951).
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of them 50 has received a construction which, in effect, makes the
statute one of the more restricted ones. Although these statutes are
not uniform in detail, they all have as a common characteristic one
or more of the following descriptive terms: "equipment," 151 "other
goods and chattels," 152 "property," '53 or "personal property."' 4 The
most inclusive of all the statutes is that of South Carolina, since in
addition to stock and fixtures it covers ... . accounts or notes receiv-
able, choses in action or any property of whatever kind and descrip-
tion used in connection with... [a] mercantile business ... ,,"'5 Al-
though this statute has not been judicially construed, it is clear that
any property belonging to any mercantile business is subject to it
provided- the major portion thereof is sold in bulk.
Several of the statutes refer to "personal property I "5 or "prop-
erty, 5 7 other phrases of broad content, but neither have any of
those statutes been subjected to judicial construction. Again it is
clear that the most limited construction which could reasonably be
given to such statutes is that they apply to all tangible chattels, al-
though "property," unmodified, would normally be construed to in-
clude realty as well as personalty.
An examination of the cases from those jurisdictions whose statutes
apply to "goods and chattels" or "other goods and chattels" of the
business reveals that this seemingly broad language has not received
uniform construction. Three statutes contain that phraseology, those
of Illinois, 58 Louisiana' 59 and New Jersey.160 The Louisiana statute
reads in part:
[A] ny portion or the whole of a stock of merchandise, or mer-
chandise and fixtures, or of all or substantially all of the fixtures
150. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:29-1 (1940). See text at note 171 infra, for a dis-
cussion of VanGenderen v. Arrow Bus Lines, Inc., 107 N.J. Eq. 217, 151 Atl. 605(Ct. Err. & App. 1930), the case which limited the New Jersey statute, perhaps
to the merchandise and fixtures of a retail merchant. The earlier broad inter-
pretation given the New Jersey statute by the Supreme Court of Errors of Con-
necticut in Kranke v. American Fabrics Co., 112 Conn. 58, 151 Atl. 312 (1930),
has been repudiated by the New Jersey Supreme Court. See Samuelson v. Gold-
berg, 13 N.J. Misc. 204 177 Atl. 260 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
151. CAL. CIV. CODE 1 3440.1 (Supp. 1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 64-701 (1948)
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2961 (1950); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 427.010 (Vernon 1950);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 36-501 (1952); NEV. CoMp. LAWS § 6816 (Supp. 1949); OnI.
REV. STAT. § 79.010 (1953); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-2-1 (1953); WASH. REv. CODE§ 63.08.010 (1951).
152. ILl. ANN. STAT. c. 121%, § 78 (Supp. 1953); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2961(1950); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:29-1 (1940).
153. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 64-701 (1948); S.C. CODE § 11-201 (1952); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 25-2-1 (1953).
154. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 18-201 (1947).
155. S.C. CODE § 11-201 (1952).
156. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 18-201 (1947).
157. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 64-701 (1948); S.C. CODE § 11-201 (1952); UTAH
COD ANN. § 25-2-1 (1953).
158. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 121%, § 78 (Supp. 1953).
159. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2961 (1950).
160. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:29-1 (1940).
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or equipment used or to be used in the display, manufacture,
care, or delivery of any goods, wares, or merchandise including
movable store and office fixtures, horses, wagons, automobile
trucks and other vehicles or other goods or chattels of the busi-
ness. .. .1
Two cases, both decided in 1930, have construed the statute on this
point. In Denekamp v. Heiser,"1 2 the court said that the words
".. . plainly relate to the goods or chattels of the same kind referred
to in the detailed description." ' 3 What the court meant by that
language was made clear shortly thereafter in Item Co., Ltd. v. Na-
tional Dyers & Cleaners, Ltd.,64 where all of the chattels of a clean-
ing and dyeing establishment were sold without compliance with the
statute. The issue in the case was whether the words "other goods or
chattels" should be interpreted as bringing within the statute non-
mercantile businesses. In refusing to so interpret the statute, the
court said:
However, we do not feel that by including in the inhibition
the sale of "other goods or chattels" the Legislature intended to
bring into the contemplation of the statute all businesses, but that
the words above quoted were inserted for the purpose of bringing
within the terms of the statute, not all businesses, buWt all prop-
crig owned by anyone engaged in the particular class of business
contemplated, that of buying and selling merchandise.1' [Italics
added.]
The Illinois cases, on the other hand, have gone farther, and have
held that the words not only have reference to property owned but
also to the kinds of businesses covered by the statute. Unquestionably
the influence of the Off case'" holding the earlier Illinois statute un-
constitutional on the ground that its coverage was not sufficiently
broad has been great.67 It is clear, however, that the Illinois statute
has been construed as including every conceivable kind of personal
property, including even intangibles, of all kinds of businesses.168
161. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2961 (1950).
162. 12 La. App. 471 (1930).
163. Id. at 474.
164. 15 La. App. 108, 130 So. 879 (1930). A companion case, Deverges v.
National Dyers & Cleaners, Ltd., 15 La. App. 339 (1930), was decided on the
same reasoning.
165. Item Co., Ltd. v. National Dyers & Cleaners, Ltd., 15 La. App. 108, 110,
130 So. 879, 881 (1930).
166. Charles J. Off & Co. v. Morehead, 235 Ill. 40, 85 N.E. 264 (1908).
167. The legislative and judicial history of the Illinois statute which has led to
the broad construction now given it is traced in Miller, supra, note 1, text at notes
66 et seq.
168. Landers Frary & Clark v. Vischer Products Co., 201 F.2d 319 (7th Cir.
1953); Main v. Hall, 41 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1930); Swern v. Liggett, 51 F.2d 821
(E.D. I1. 1931) ; Coon v. Doss, 361 Ill. 515, 198 N.E. 341 (1935) ; LaSalle Opera
House Co. v. LaSalle Amusement Co., 289 I1. 194, 124 N.E. 454 (1919) ; Weskal-
nies v. Hesterman, 288 Ill. 199, 123 N.E. 314 (1919); G. S. Johnson Co. v.
Beloosky, 263 Ill. 363, 105 N.E. 287 (1914) ; Corrigan v. Miller, 338 Ill. App. 212,
86 N.E.2d 853 (1949); St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Company of Saint Paul v.
Hoey, 325 II. App. 693, 60 N.E.2d 641 (1945); Copeliares v. Copeliares, 297 Ill.
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Perhaps the extreme example of the liberal attitude of the Illinois
courts toward the statute is LaSale Opera House Co. v. LaSalle
Amusement Co.,10 9 where the court held that the lease, furniture,
fixtures, good will, trade-marks, trade names and all other property of
a theatrical business were covered by the statute.
But in New Jersey, an equally broadly-worded statute has re-
ceived anything but a broad construction. The New Jersey statute
refers to the
...whole or a large part of the stock or merchandise and
fixtures or merchandise or fixtures, or goods and chattels, other-
wise than in the ordinary course of trade and in the regular and
usual prosecution of the seller's business or occupation .... 110
Examination of the quoted language indicates that this is one of the
broadest of all bulk sales statutes, for the words "or occupation" sug-
gest that it is not even confined to mercantile businesses; certainly it
would not seem to exclude any kind of tangible chattel of a mercantile
business. But the Court of Errors and Appeals gave the statute a much
narrower construction in VanGenderen v. Arrow Bus Lines.'l There
a bus company sold its fleet of buses without complying with the
statute. As in the Louisiana cases,17 2 the contention was made that
"other goods and chattels" should be construed to include the goods
and chattels of non-mercantile businesses. Like the Louisiana court,
the New Jersey court rejected that contention, but it went farther
and said:
The words "otherwise than ... in the regular and usual prose-
cution of the seller's business" indicate by necessary implication,
as it seems to us, that the goods, chattels and merchandise which
are the subject matter of the statute are those which the owner
sells in parcels in the regular and usual prosecution of his busi-
ness. In other words, that the class of vendors embraced in the
statutory provision are those whose business is the sale of stock
App. 647, 18 N.E.2d 120 (1938); Tipsword v. Doss, 273 Ill. App. 1 (1933); Athon
v. McAllister, 205 II. App. 41 (1917); Page v. Wright, 194 Ill. App. 149 (1915).
In People ex reL. Nelson v. Sherrard State Bank, 258 Ill. App. 168 (1930), the
court held the statute inapplicable to intangibles, but indicated agreement with
the text statement as to the scope of the statute with reference to tangibles. In
concluding that intangibles were not covered, the court seemed to be unaware of
the case of LaSalle Opera House Co. v. LaSalle Amusement Co., 289 Ill. 194, 124
N.E. 454 (1919). In this regard see, Landers Frary & Clark v. Vischer Products
Co., 201 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1953). See also, Herschi v. H. Albrecht & Co., 202 Ill.
App. 573 (1916) and Larson v. Judd, 200 Ill. App. 420 (1916). Contra: Ettelson
v. Sonkopp, 210 Ill. App. 348 (1918)' H S. Richardson Coal Co. v. Cermak, 190
Ill. App. 106 (1914); Heslop v. Golden, 189 Ill. App. 388 (1914). The latter
cases clearly do not represent the law in Illinois. The Heslop and Richardson
decisions were apparently handed down prior to the supreme court decision in
G. S. Johnson & Co. v. Beloosky, 263 Ill. 363, 105 N.E. 287 (1914), but that is
not true of the Ettelson ease.
169. 289 Ill. 194, 124 N.E. 454 (1919).
170. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:29-1 (1940).
171. 107 N.J. Eq. 217, 151 Atl. 605 (Ct. Err. & App. 1930).
172. See text at note 162 et seq., supra.
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or merchandise to intending customers who resort to the place
where such stock or merchandise is kept for sale to such persons.
The prohibition of the statute, as we see it, is directed solely at
the bulk sale of this stock or merchandise by a person carrying
on such business, and includes the sale of the fixtures used by
such person in the carrying on of that business 73
But that reasoning will not bear analysis. Under this statute the
court is faced with two alternatives, either the language ".... in the
ordinary course of trade and in the regular and usual prosecution of
the seller's business or occupation. . ." modifies and limits all the
items preceding it, or none of them. Obviously it cannot be interpreted
to modify none of the items, else it would be useless. Thus far the
court is on sound ground. The logical alternative, however, is not
"some" but "all" of the items preceding the language in question.
Here is the place where the court went astray, and the error was
doubtless based on the same idea, discussed earlier, which led the
Supreme Court of Texas to exclude the sale of fixtures alone from the
operation of the Texas statute.7 4 The rationale is that only merchan-
dise can be sold in the ordinary course of trade, and, therefore, the
sale of anything else is always outside the ordinary course of trade.
Consequently, if the statute forbids the sale of items outside the
ordinary course of trade, there is a negative inference that under
some circumstances such items must be capable of sale in the ordinary
course of trade. In the Texas case, the conclusion from those prem-
ises was that the subject matter of an interdicted transaction had
to consist, at least in part, of something which could be so sold, i.e.,
in the ordinary course of trade.Y5 In the New Jersey case, however,
the court was less logical. It reached the conclusion, at least in terms
of result, that "other goods and chattels" can never be sold in the
ordinary course of trade unless they are synonymous with merchan-
dise, but that fixtures can. The basic difficulty, the faulty premise, is
that something other than merchandise can never be disposed of in
the ordinary course of trade. As has been explained earlier in this
article in connection with the Texas cases, that assumption is simply
not true when consideration is given to the purpose of the "ordinary
course of trade" language.' " In the New Jersey case, that false prem-
ise has led to an unjustifiably restricted definition of the phrase, but,
173. VanGenderen v. Arrow Bus Lines, 107 N.J. Eq. 217, 218, 219, 151 Atl.
605, 606 (Ct. Err. & App. 1930).
174. See text at notes 81 et seq., supra, for a discussion of the rationale under-
lying the decision in M System Stores, Inc. v. Johnston, 124 Tex. 238, 76 S.W.2d
503 (1934).
175. Ibid.
176. See text at notes 82-83 supra. Recognition of the fact that some bulk
mortgages may be in the ordinary course of trade may be found in First National
Bank of Shreveport, La. v. Sharp, 54 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1932).
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more important, it has caused the court to do great violence to the
clear statutory language.
Perhaps the word most often found in the group of statutes under
consideration in this section is "equipment."1'7 That, too, is a broad
term which, in the few cases arising under these statutes, has been
construed to mean those things which "... the vendor or merchant or
trader owns and uses in connection with and incident to the sale of
his goods, wares and merchandise."' 8 In short, "equipment" means
the same thing that "fixtures" means to those courts which have
given a nontechnical meaning to the latter term."19 Other specific
items mentioned in some of the statutes include "supplies,"'18 "ma-
chinery,"1 3' "motor vehicles,"'' 2 "horses,"'8 3 "wagons"'' 14 and "furni-
ture."18
Only the California statute requires further detailed consideration.
The statute refers to
The sale . . . of a stock in trade ... and the sale ... of the
fixtures or store equipment of a baker, cafe or restaurant owner,
garage owner, machinist, cleaner and dyer, or retail or whole-
sale merchant... .286
In Woodrff v. Laugkhra, s18 a chattel mortgage was given on three
types of property of a jewel manufacturing business, which sold its
output at both wholesale and retail: (1) the stock in trade, (2)
machines used in the business such as electric motors and cutting
machines, and (3) what the court described as "... [property] used
to do merchandising with, wholesale and retail."'88 The court held
the mortgage invalid as to items (1) and (3), but not as to item (2),
taking the position that machines used in manufacturing were neither
fixtures nor store equipment of machinists or of retail or wholesale
merchants. Undoubtedly the use of the modifying and limiting term
177. CAL. CiV. CODr § 3440.1 (Supp. 1953); IDAHo CODi ANN. § 64-701 (1948) ;
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2961 (1950) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 427.010 (Vernon 1950);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 36-501 (1952); N. CoMP. LAWS § 6816 (Supp. 1949); OT.
REv. STAT. § 79.010 (1953); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-2-1 (1953); WAsH. ReV. CODE
§ 63.08.010 (1951).
178. Independent Breweries Co. v. Lawton, 200 Mo. App. 238, 241, 204 S.W.
730, 731 (1918). And see, Bolanovich v. Peter Hauptmann Tobacco Co., 261 S.W.
723 (Mo. App. 1924); Baiter and Miller v. Crum, 199 Mo. App. 380, 203 S.W.
506 (1918).
179. See the discussion in the text at notes 122 et seq., supra.
180. IDAHO CODS ANN. § 64-701 (1948); ORE. RPv. STAT. § 79.010 (1953);
UTAH CODS ANN. § 25-2-1 (1953).
181. NEB. REV. STAT. § 36-501 (1952).
182. LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2961 (1950) (automobile trucks and other ve-
hicles); NEv. CoMP. LAWS § 6816 (Supp. 1949) (motor or other vehicles or
trucks); OMs. RuV. STAT. § 79.010 (1953) (motor vehicles).
183. LA. Ry. STAT. ANN. § 9:2961 (1950).
184. Ibid.
185. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 64-701 (1948); UTAH CODS ANN. § 25-2-1 (1953).
186. CAL. CIrv. CODE § 3440.1 (Supp. 1953).
187. 50 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1931).
188. Id. at 535.
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"store" in the statute caused the court to take that position, for other-
wise the decision is clearly erroneous. In the case of In re Bowers,""
the court held the statute applicable to a mortgage on such things
as the tables, dishes, chairs, benches, pots, pans and silverware of a
"breakfast club."
On the whole, the courts have interpreted the broader statutes
consonantly with both their language and spirit. The terms employed
in these statutes point clearly to an over-all legislative purpose to ex-
tend the scope of the older forms of bulk sales legislation, and the
courts have aided in the carrying out of that purpose. The New Jersey
Court of Errors and Appeals, however, has taken a position, with
respect to its statute, that is difficult to justify either from the view-
point of the language alone, or from the over-all purpose and scope
of that statute as disclosed by the breadth of the language employed.
C. Intangibles.
Although only the South Carolina statute1 , expressly designates
certain intangibles as coming within its scope, a few of the other stat-
utes contain language which is broad enough to include intangible
property. Thus the terms "property"1 1 and "personal property,'"19 '
found in some of the statutes are clearly descriptive of both tangible
and intangible property. However, none of those statutes has ever
been judicially construed with reference to the point under discus-
sion.
Courts, when faced with the issue of whether intangibles are
covered by bulk sales statutes, have almost uniformly excluded them
from the coverage of the statutes. Thus good will, ,' a franchise,19 a
list of customers,'0 leases, 9e accounts receivable,11 prepaid insur-
1S9. 3 : F. Supp. 965 (S.D. Cal. 1940). The principal issue in the case was
whether a "breakfast club," the owner of which served meals and drinks to only
selected portions of the public by special arrangement, was a restaurant or cafe
under the statute. The court held that it was.
190. S.C. COps 9 11-201 (1952).
191. IAHo CODS AN:. § 64-701 (1948); S.C. CoD § 11-201 (1952); UTAH Cons
ANN. § 25-2-1 (1953).
192. MoNT. REv. CoDrs ANN. 5 18-201 (1947).
193. Thorndike & Hix Lobster Co. v. Hall, 132 Misc. 723, 230 N.Y. Supp. 554(Sup. Ct. 1928).
194. Begnell v. Safety Coach Line, Inc., 198 N.C. 688, 153 S.E. 264 (1930). It
should be pointed out, however, that the holding in the case was that a company
operating a bus line had no merchandise of any kind, so that whatever it sold,
tangible or intangible, fell outside the operation of the statute.
195. Smith v. Munizza, 170 Pa. Super. 122, 84 A.2d 352 (1951).
196. Begnell v. Safety Coach Line, Inc., 198 N.C. 688, 153 S.E. 264 (1930)(see discussion in note 194 supra); Leidersdorf v. Kress, 169 Wis. 484, 173 N.W.
218 (1919) (by implication). See also, Saqui v. Wiricks, 167 N.Y. Supp. 661
(Sup. Ct. 1917).
197. Hood Rubber Products Co. v. Dickey, 167 Okla. 304, 29 P.2d 115 (1934);
Fischer v. Rio Tire Co., 65 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Com. App. 1933).
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ance,08 unexpired vehicle licenses,10 9 conditional sales contracts and
notes, 200 and trade names 20, have been held to be outside the scope of
the statutes. A notable exception, however, is the interpretation given
the Illinois statute on this point, an interpretation consistent with
that given to the same statute in connection with the problems of
businesses covered 202 and tangible property covered.20 3
Reference has already been made20' to the case of LaSalle Opera,
House Co. v. LaSalle Amusement Ca.,20 5 which held the statute ap-
plicable to the sale of the lease, furniture, fixtures, equipment, good
will, trade-mark and trade names of a theatrical company. Although
in People v. Sherrard State Bank , 20 6 the court ruled that the Illinois
statute did not cover the transfer of intangibles, it is apparent that
the court must have been unaware of the LaSalle case; it was nowhere
mentioned in the opinion. In Landers Frary & Clark v. Visoher Prod-
uCts Co., 207 there is a clear holding that the Illinois statute covers
intangible as well as tangible property, the intangibles being patent
rights on which royalties were being collected.
It is clear that except for the statutes such as that of South Caro-
lina and those which employ the phrases "property" or "personal prop-
erty," since intangibles are not goods, wares, merchandise, fixtures,
equipment, or other goods and chattels of a business, they should not
be held to come within the bulk sales statutes. Again reference must
be made to the reasons behind the extremely broad interpretation
given to the Illinois statute not only in this but in other areas, for
the Illinois cases are not otherwise explicable.
D. Reat Property.
Three of the statutes0 8 refer to "property" without the limiting ad-
jective "personal." There is room for argument that such statutes
contemplate not only personal property but also real property as
coming within their scope. Nevertheless, if the word be considered
in its context, it is very doubtful that the broader meaning should be
given it. The South Carolina statute lists several kinds of personal
198. Fischer v. Rio Tire Co., 65 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Com. App. 1933).
199. Ibid.
200. Starr Piano Co. v. Sammak, 235 N.Y. 566, 139 N.E. 737 (1923).
201. Begnell v. Safety Coach Line, Inc., 198 N.C. 688, 153 S.E. 264 (1930)(see discussion in note 194 supra).
202. See Miller, supra note 1, text at notes 66 et seq.
203. See text at notes 166 et seq., supra.
204. See text at note 169 supra.
205. 289 Ill. 194, 124 N.E. 454 (1919).
206. 258 II. App. 168 (1930).
207. 201 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1953). The federal court relied on the cases of
Coon v. Doss, 361 Il. 515, 198 N.E. 341 (1935); LaSalle Opera House Co. v.
LaSalle Amusement Co., 289 Il. 194, 124 N.E. 454 (1919), and G. S. Johnson Co.
v. Beloosky, 263 Ill. 363, 105 N.E. 287 (1914).
208. IDAHo CoDE ANN. § 64-701 (1948); S.C. CODE 9 11-201 (1952); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 25-2-1 (1953).
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property followed by the words "'... or any property of whatever
kind and description. . .""1 Although the last phrase makes the
ejusdem generis rule of dubious applicability, yet it remains true
that all of the listed items are personal property, either tangible or
intangible. Further, there is no evidence to show that the sale of
real estate in any way was responsible for the rise of bulk sales legis-
lation; much of the difficulty arose from the fact that the goods, as
well as the seller of them, were spirited out of reach, and that can-
not be accomplished with real estate.21
The Utah statute-2 1  requires that the property must be used in
carrying on the business, and although real property certainly can be
and is used, in one sense, to carry on a business to which it belongs,
yet the word "property," as the first item in a list of things including
furniture, fixtures, equipment and supplies, probably means some-
thing less than "property" in the fullest possible sense of the term.
Else, why list the other things, for certainly they too are property.
The same may be said of the Idaho statute,212 although curiously
enough under that statute there is no requirement that the "property"
be used in carrying on the business, whereas there is such a require-
ment with respect to the other listed items. 213
The few cases which have considered the problem have been clear
and definite in holding that bulk sales legislation was not designed to
affect the disposition of realty.2 14 Certainly those cases, decided under
statutes which contain no affirmative suggestion that they apply to
realty, which, in fact, contain internal evidence that they are re-
stricted to personalty, have been correctly decided.
E. Exctnpt Property.
Although only five21' of the statutes expressly exclude exempt prop-
erty from their operation, many of the courts have reached the same
209. S.C. CODE § 11-201 (1952).
210. See Note, 20 IOwA L. Rsv. 815 (1935).
211. UTAH CODs ANN. § 25-2-1 (1953).
212. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 64-701 (1948).
213. Ibid. The section reads in part:
[O]r any portion of the property, furniture, fixtures, or equipment or sup-
plies of a hotel, restaurant, barber shop or any place of business wherein the
furniture, fixtures, or equipment are used in carrying on said business....
Attention is directed to the fact that in describing what is used in carrying on the
business, only some of the items previously mentioned are repeated.
214. Root Refineries v. Gay Oil Co., 171 Ark. 129, 284 S.W. 26 (1926); Ven-
trilla v. Tortorice, 160 La. 516, 107 So. 390 (1926); Geck v. Security State Bank,
133 Okla. 67, 271 Pac. 152 (1928); Hall v. Conine, 230 S.W. 823 (Tex. Civ. App.
1921). See also, In re Elliott, 48 F. Supp. 146 (D.C. Kan. 1942), and Robbins v.
Fuller, 148 Ark. 173, 229 S.W. 8 (1921).
215. ALA. CODE tit. 20, § 12 (Supp. 1951); CAL. Cirv. CoDE § 3440.1 (Supp.
1953); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 121%, § 80 (Supp. 1953); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 427.010
(Vernon 1950); N.C. GEN. STAT. 1 39-23 (1950). The following cases decided
under these statutes have recognized by implication or otherwise that they do
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conclusion in the absence of express provision.21 In fact, most of the
appellate litigation on the question has been concerned with what has
to be done under what circumstances in order to enable the noncom-
plying bulk purchaser to take advantage of the seller's statutory
exemptions. In short, the theory underlying all of the decisions is
that under some circumstances property exempt to the seller may be
sold without compliance with the bulk sales statutes. The circum-
stances which might have the result of making the exemption un-
available are these: (1) the seller did not specifically claim the ex-
emption; (2) the property forming the subject matter of the contro-
versy was exempt, not absolutely, but only if selected by the claimant
and claimed as his exemption; and (3) the absence of a good faith
effort to comply with the statute.
Several cases have taken the position that the seller must claim
his exemption at the time of the transfer, in some more or less formal
way, in order that the purchaser may have the benefit of the seller's
exemption.21 7 If, however, the property sold, as well as any other
property owned by the seller prior to the sale, is less in total value
than the amount of the exemption, there is no necessity for selection;
thus the bulk sales statute has no application to such a transfer.218 In
fact the Michigan case cited imposes the requirement of selection by
the seller only if the amount of property involved in the transaction
sought to be subjected to the bulk sales statute is greater than the
amount of the exemption.219
In the Pennsylvania cases a distinction has been drawn between
transfers which are fraudulent in fact and transfers which fail only
because of inadvertent noncompliance with the statute. In both
not apply to exempt property: Stickney v. L. & E. Lamar, 201 Ala. 549, 78 So. 903(1918); Herschi v. H. Albrecht & Co., 202 Ill. App. 573 (1916); Brown Shoe Co.
v. Sacks, 201 Mo. App. 360, 211 S.W. 133 (1919); Whitmore-Ligon Co., Inc. v.
Hyatt, 175 N.C. 117, 95 S.E. 38 (1918).
216. The following cases, decided under statutes which make no reference to
exempt property, have held the statutes inapplicable to it without any sugges-
tion that there might be circumstances where that would not be true: In re
Dederick, 91 F.2d 646 (10th Cir. 1937) (Kansas Statute); Rich v. The C. Calla-
han Co., 179 Ind. 509, 101 N.E. 810 (1913); Des Moines Packing Co. v. Uncaphor,
174 Iowa 39, 156 N.W. 171 (1916); Joyce v. Armourdale State Bank, 130 Kan.
147, 285 Pac. 525 (1930) ; Saunders v. Graff, 103 Kan. 261, 173 Pac. 413 (1918);
Orgill Bros. v. Gee, 15 Miss. 590, 120 So. 737 (1928); Congress Candy Co. v.
Farmer, 73 N.D. 174, 12 N.W.2d 796 (1944); Cross v. Inge, 105 Okla. 145, 231
Pac. 1066 (1924) ; Missos v. Spyros, 182 Wis. 631, 197 N.W. 196 (1924).
217. Griffin v. Puryear-Meyer Grocer Co., 202 Ark. 495, 151 S.W.2d 656(1941) ; Merchants' & Farmers' Bank v. Reel, 181 Ark. 969, 28 S.W.2d 725(1930) ; Griffin v. Batterall Shoe Co., 137 Ark. 37, 207 S.W. 439 (1918); Hoja
v. Motoc, 235 Mich. 258, 209 N.W. 66 (1926); McCormick v. Kistler 175 Mich.
422, 141 N.W. 593 (1913); J. L. Hudson Co. v. No-Name Hat Co., 174 Mich. 109,
140 N.W. 507 (1913).
218. McCormick v. Kistler, 175 Mich. 422, 141 N.W. 593 (1913). There is a
suggestion in the case of Griffin v. Batterall Shoe Co., 137 Ark. 37, 207 S.W. 439(1918), that the same rule may apply in Arkansas.
219. McCormick v. Kistler, 175 Mich. 422, 141 N.W. 593 (1913).
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cases2 " arising under the Pennsylvania statute, the purchase money
was put in escrow, and in both of them the seller claimed that he was
entitled to be paid three hundred dollars, the amount of his statutory
exemption. There the similarity ended, for in one of the cases 22 1 the
seller denied that he had any creditors, while in the other 22 - a list
of creditors was given by the seller but the buyer failed to notify one
of them. In the latter case the Superior Court reversed the trial court's
refusal to permit the exemption, taking the position that a claimant's
right to his statutory exemption will be lost only if fraud exists in
the very transaction in which a levy is made, and that the "construc-
tive fraud" arising from noncompliance with the bulk sales law is
not sufficient to deprive the seller of his exemption. In the Konrge
case, however, no distinction was drawn between transfers fraudulent
in fact and those merely constructively fraudulent, the court stating
broadly that the exemption statutes were not designed to aid a debtor
in defrauding his creditors. The court relied on the trial court's
decision in the Birler Co. case, but was apparently unaware of the
fact that the case had been reversed by the Superior Court. Neverthe-
less, it is apparent that since there was a wilful denial by the seller
of the existence of creditors, the Kourge decision was a correct one
under the distinction drawn in the HixIer Co. case. It should be noted
at this point that the question in the Pennsylvania decisions was
whether the exemption was available to the seller, whereas in the
other cases the question was whether the purchaser could take ad-
vantage of the seller's exemption.
In Congress Candy Co. v. Farmer, 22 the Supreme Court of North
Dakota refused to draw a distinction between property absolutely
exempt and property which a debtor may claim as exempt by some
process of selection. In holding the bulk sales law inapplicable to the
sale of any kind of exempt property the court offered the following
rationale:
It seems clear that no injury is caused to a creditor because a
debtor disposes of property which he can claim as exempt in
event the creditor seeks to enforce payment of the claim by levy
of attachment or execution against such property. Certain it is
that no greater injury will be caused to a creditor if the debtor
disposes of the property before the creditor seeks to subject the
property to the creditor's claim, than if the debtor retains the
property, and exercises his legal right and claims the property as
220. Bixler Co. v. Kennedy, 64 Pa. Super. 41 (1916), reversing, 18 Luz. Leg.
Reg. Rep. 135 (1915); Kourge v Sariotes, 30 Pa. Dist. 65 (1920).
221. Kourge v. Sarlotes, 30 Pa. Dist. 65 (1920).
222. Bixler Co. v. Kennedy, 64 Pa. Super. 41 (1916), reversing, 18 Luz. Leg.
Reg. Rep, 135 (1915).
223. 73 N.D. 174, 12 N.W.2d 796 (1944).
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exempt after the creditor has instituted legal proceedings to sub-
ject the property to the payment of the claim. 21
The rationale of the North Dakota court, which underlies many of
the other decisions as well,' is clearly correct. If the creditor can-
not reach the property in the hands of the debtor because of the
operation of the exemption 'laws, he loses nothing when that property
is sold by the debtor. Nor should it be necessary in the situation in
which he has both exempt and nonexempt property, that the debtor
select his property in advance as exempt, for the creditor in such a
case can easily force the debtor to make a selection at the time of
levy and execution, and proceed against what must then be available
as nonexempt property.
F. The Uniform Commercial Code Solution."r-
Section 6-102 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides:
(1) A "bulk transfer" is any transfer in bulk and not in the
ordinary course of the transferor's business of a major part of
the materials, supplies, merchandise or other inventory (Sec-
tion 9-109) of an enterprise subject to this Article.
(2) A transfer of a substantial part of the equipment (Section
9-109) of such an enterprise is a bulk transfer if it is made in
connection with a bulk transfer of inventory, but not otherwise.
Section 9-109 states that:
Goods are
"(2i "equipment" if they are used or bought for use primarily
in business (including farming or a profession) or by a debtor
who is a non-profit organization or a governmental subdivision or
agency or if the goods are not included in the definitions of in-
ventory, farm products or consumer goods;
"(4) "inventory" if they are held or are being prepared for sale
or are to be furnished under a contract of service or if they are
raw materials, work in process or materials used or consumed in
a business. If goods are inventory they are neither farm prod-
ucts nor equipment.
224. Id. at 190, 12 N.W.2d at 803.
225. See, e.g., the statement of Burch, J., in Saunders v. Graff, 103 Kan. 201,
173 Pac. 413 (1918):
[T]he bulk-sales act was intended to operate only on property toward which
creditors may look for satisfaction of their claims. While the statute is reme-
dial, in that it is designed to frustrate fraud, and for that reason is to be
liberally construed . . ., there is no fraud in withholding exempt property
from satisfaction of a debtor's obligations. Creditors are not concerned with
any disposition which the owner may make of it.
Id. at 262, 173 Pac. at 413.
226. All references to the Uniform Commercial Code are to the Official Draft,
Text and Comments Edition (1952), as amended by Recommendations of the
Editorial Board for Changes in the Text and Comments of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code Official Draft, Text and Comments Edition, dated June 1, 1953.
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Thus it is clear that there are two major kinds of goods which can
form the subject matter of an interdicted transaction; inventory and
equipment. In a general way, but in a general way only, these items
correspond to the merchandise and fixtures of the present statutes.
Comment 3 to section 9-109 states that "[t]he principal test to deter-
mine whether goods are inventory is that they are held for immediate
or ultimate sale... ," but recognizes ".... that one class of goods which
is not held for ultimate disposition to a purchaser is included in
inventory: 'Materials used or consumed in a business'." It continues,
"In general it may be said that goods used in a business are equip-
ment when they are fixed assets or have, as identifiable units, a
relatively long period of use; but are inventory, even though not held
for sale, if they are used up or consumed in a short period of time in
the production of some end product."
Obviously inventory, as defined in the Code, is a much broader
term than merchandise, as defined by the courts under the existing
statutes. Even the most liberal courts, those which have in effect con-
sidered the finished products of a manufactory to be merchandise,
have not included the raw materials or works in process as does the
Code. Furthermore, only a few courts have included such things as
supplies consumed in the business, e.g., fuel used or stationery, as mer-
chandise, although some courts have included them within the term
"fixtures."
Comment 5 to the same section states that "equipment" is prin-
cipally defined in negative terms: any goods not covered by any other
definition in the section; i.e., if they are not "consumer goods," "farm
products" nor "inventory," they are "equipment." Equipment, then,
corresponds roughly to the term "fixtures" under the present statutes,
for although it excludes some things which a few courts have in-
cluded under the definition, those are items which the Code definition
of "inventory" would include. Conversely, "equipment" and "inven-
tory" together cover more things than any of the existing statutes
cover under the headings of "merchandise" and "fixtures."
Although section 6-102 speaks of ". . . materials, supplies, mer-
chandise... ," those terms are not defined elsewhere in the Code. But
certainly the broad definition of inventory includes materials, supplies
and merchandise. Furthermore, the phrasing makes it abundantly
clear that these are not things different from "inventory," but rather,
some of the particular classes of things which comprise the general
class "inventory."
Attention is directed to the fact that the sale of equipment alone is
never subject to the article. If, and only if, the transfer qualifies as
a transfer subject to the article under subsection 1, i.e., independently
of any equipment which is included in it, will the sale of the equip-
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ment be covered. The comments do not reveal the reason for this
choice. Probably it rests on a recognition of the fact that the inven-
tory is the only thing which many classes of unsecured creditors can
look to for payment, and so is the real basis for the extension of
credit, whereas equipment is more often the security for direct lend-
ers or even the sellers of the equipment itself. And it is a much
simpler matter for the creditor who relies on the equipment as the
basis for the extension of credit to protect himself.
Subsection 6-103(8) expressly excludes property exempt from exe-
cution, and the description of the included items is sufficiently def-
inite to preclude any contention that either intangibles or real estate
is covered.
CRITIQUE AND SUMMARY
One conclusion of considerable significance is affirmed by the analy-
sis just completed. It is that only in a very general sense may bulk
sales statutes be treated as a generic unit for purposes of determining
to what kinds of property they apply. The variations in language
in the statutes are much greater than has generally been assumed.
Consequently the value of a study of this kind is greatest as a means
of examining and comparing the solutions which the legislatures
have worked out, using the cases only to understand and evaluate the
legislative handling of the problem. Stated conversely, the study has
limited value in the sense of its being a comparative study of how
courts have reacted, for the stimuli to those reactions in which we
are interested have been too variant to permit careful and accurate
comparison. This is not to say that we can draw no conclusions, nor
that this aspect of the study is completely without value. Rather the
statement is made to destroy any notion that this kind of study yields
even as satisfactory a basis for comparing the work of courts as does
the more standard study of common law cases, limited though that
may be by other local rules not common to most of the jurisdictions
covered.
Nevertheless it is a fair conclusion to say that all of the statutes
cover merchandise in the sense of goods purchased for resale in the
ordinary course of trade; that many of them cover the transfer of
fixtures, sometimes alone, and sometimes only in connection with the
transfer of merchandise; that the precise statutory language is very
important in determining the solution to the latter problem; that a
substantial number of the statutes are clearly broader with respect
to property covered than most of them; that intangibles and realty
are almost never considered as coming within the bulk sales statutes;
and, that under at least some circumstances exempt property is ex-
cluded from the operation of all of them.
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Although there have been some very narrow interpretations given
to statutory language in the cases under consideration in this article,
on the whole the construction has been liberal in fact, and, in terms
of results reached, seems to be becoming more liberal. In spite of the
fact that several of the courts have reached unsatisfactory conclusions
with respect to one or more sub-problems in this area, the vast ma-
jority of the results are sound, although faulty rationales are not
too uncommon.
The solution offered by the draftsman for the Uniform Commercial
Code Article on Bulk Transfers is not radically different in general
outline from that which exists under many of the statutes today. Of
significance, however, is that the Code section represents not the pre-
ponderance of existing practice, but the best of it. It is clear that in-
tangibles and realty should form no part of property covered, and it
is even clearer that exempt property should not. The definitions
of inventory and equipment are more satisfactory than those of any
of the present statutes. The inclusion of equipment only if inventory
is also sold as part of the same transaction is sensible. Unsecured
credit is not ordinarily extended on the basis of equipment, since the
lender should realize that if he does not utilize the equipment as
security, someone else will. On the other hand, it is also sensible to
treat an entire transaction as a unit for bulk sales purposes, so that
if a bulk transfer of inventory is made and substantial equipment is
included, the whole transfer should fall within the act.
But above all, the statute fairly shouts the draftsman's awareness
of the ever-existing conflict between the need for certainty and the
need for exact justice in the commercial law area. That is not to say
that a statute which is exact and certain must inevitably be unfair;
quite the opposite may be true. But it is, nevertheless, a fact that
borderline cases will frequently be decided less justly, in the lay sense,
under very precisely worded statutes. The reason is clear: the more
precise the language becomes, the less attention can be given to the
infinite variants in facts. Here the draftsman in effect said frankly:
we cannot list every possible kind of property in detail; there is some
overlap between some of the categories in the sense that inclusion in
one rather than the other will in certain fact situations be arguable;
we cannot anticipate each of those fact situations; therefore, by illus-
tration and explanation in the comments, we will provide a guide for
merchants, lawyers and judges. That will enable the merchant to be
guided by his attorney in acting, and it will be helpful to the judge if
the borderline situations arise, as they inevitably do, without so tying
his hands that he cannot distinguish variant fact situations which
should be distinguished. In this effort, I believe, the draftsman has
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been successful. Where exactness was possible and desirable, the
language is precise, but where precision could be achieved only at
the expense of fairness in some situations, more general language
was used, and guides set out to aid in the solution of the unusual
problem.
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